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Abstract

Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire and sought to create a unique realm,
where all people Greek and non-Greek would be able to live in relative autonomy under the
monarch. Scholars have debated Alexander’s intent for the last century and still cannot find
consensus. This thesis will approach the intent by focusing on the question of how Alexander
governed the empire he conquered. Specifically, did he intend for the people of the conquered
landmass to become a new type of integrated culture led by him and his progeny? If it is
possible to answer this question, it may give some indication of whether or not Alexander was
anything more than a “mere” conqueror. Refusing to be bound by xenophobic tradition,
Alexander ruled with the assistance of foreign nobles serving as administrators. He took on a
more recognizable and palatable appearance for the newly conquered and then finally acted to
unify the top tier of the Persians with his friends and commanders. This study concludes that
pragmatism and foresight allowed Alexander to accept all of Persia’s inhabitants as subjects,
regardless of ethnicity, and meld them in a way that would ultimately contribute to a more stable
empire.

iv

Introduction

Who was Alexander the Great? Was he (as appears in some of the less flattering sources)
a Macedonian who “went native,” captivated by, and obsessed with Persian “oriental”
barbarities? Was the establishment of his own vast empire a result of hubristic selfaggrandizement? Or was it the seemingly natural progression of an ambitious but basically
pragmatic military leader’s career? The question of what ultimately drove Alexander is a
provocative one, and has been debated at length over the years ─ it was called the “biggest
question of them all” in a recent biography.1 This thesis will approach it by focusing on the
question of how Alexander governed the empire he conquered. Specifically, did he intend for
the people of the conquered landmass to become a new type of integrated culture led by him and
his progeny? If it is possible to answer this question, it may give some indication of whether or
not Alexander was anything more than a “mere” conqueror.
A comparison of the conqueror’s initial foray into Asia Minor and the Troad to the later
years of Alexander’s campaign shows that Alexander maintained a pragmatic restraint in the
conquest of the eastern Mediterranean, and pragmatic choices for governance within Persia.
Rather than pursue the Persian king into the heart of his empire, Alexander chose to complete the
strategically important seizure of all the coastal zones. In this eastern Mediterranean phase of the
campaign Alexander followed along a course that most likely had been plotted by his father
Philip II of Macedon.2 Later in the campaign, Alexander chose to incorporate Persian leaders

1
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Cartledge, Paul, Alexander the Great (Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press, 2004), 192.
See Chapter 2 for an analysis of Philip’s intentions.
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and customs into the newly formed kingdom, which represented a shift in his governance
policies. These choices were not always popular with segments of his forces, but Alexander
chose to maintain these policies despite the objections of the troops. Alexander must have
believed that utilizing preexisting governmental structures within the Persian Empire would
foster acceptance from the populace, and thus these policies are illustrations of a pragmatic
understanding of the way to rule a conquered, foreign culture.
Alexander was not always so pragmatic. Source material identifies Alexander as a
deeply religious and ideological individual who, at great personal risk, took time to visit famous
holy sites during the campaign; for example, he diverted to Ilium and later to Gordium, neither of
which held strategic significance. Forays into holy sites typically seem not to be altogether
necessary, but even here there is method to the madness: these visits occurred for symbolic
reasons. However, it should be understood that Alexander’s flexibility during the campaign and
originality at rule represent the main complementary elements of his pragmatism. These
elements allowed him to maintain control over the vast land mass and to administer his new
realm.
This thesis illustrates Alexander’s pragmatism by focusing on the period during the
second phase of the campaign when a shift in policy took place. With Persia proper in hand, the
Macedonian King began to acculturate the Persian populace. Some suggest that Alexander,
during this period showed a predilection toward the Persian culture. Alexander’s first contact
with the Persian culture occurred in Pella, Macedonia where a young Alexander questioned
visiting Persian envoys.3 This question of Alexander’s supposed predisposition will be weighed
against the literary evidence in order to see if Alexander may have been inclined toward Persian
“extravagance.” The primary conclusion is that after the death of the final Achaemenid king,
3
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Darius III, in 330 BC, Alexander used a carefully crafted propaganda campaign of image
building to cement his place as King of Asia. This guise served as a device whereby he could
garner support from both the Persian aristocrat and commoner.4
While constructing aspects of the Persian image, Alexander went further by adopting
non-Greek administered satrapal governments. Of prime significance to this study is the way in
which Alexander utilized non-Greek native administrators within his new realm. These men
were a link between the Macedonian king and his foreign subjects. The lives of rural and city
dwelling Persians were virtually unaffected under the rule of Alexander and his satraps. Taxes
were collected as before and residents were able to worship in their customary manner. These
satraps were employed in further attempts to minimize any disruption to daily life. That is not to
say that Alexander was incapable of quashing uprisings militarily, for the Macedonian military
machine was unopposed in open, organized combat by 330; rather his actions validate the main
focus of this thesis: Alexander did not desire simply to loot the Persian landscape but preferred
to consolidate these lands and incorporate them into his own realm.
It appears that Alexander sought to preserve the Persians willing to accept his dicta. He
viewed those as his own subjects after the fall of Darius. Those who demonstrated worthiness
were eventually taken as loyal allies and incorporated into the military units. Although
Macedonian garrisons were placed in every major urban center of the former Persian Empire,
Alexander did not promote force as a first choice to resolve conflicts. He recognized the value of
the systems that had existed in Persia before his conquest and did not fear using them.
The third and final component revealing Alexander’s plan for a peaceful, unified, and
prolonged kingdom was the adoption of a policy of political marriage previously employed by
his father. The primary difference between Alexander and Philip is Alexander’s inclusion of his
4
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most trusted advisors and friends in a mass marriage ceremony at Susa. This represents an
attempt at making political relationships at the highest levels of social hierarchy through
marriage. Even before the marriage at Susa Alexander allowed his common soldiers to marry
any foreign women with whom they had been cohabiting. This served Alexander in two ways;
to placate his troops and form the base for his new, eastern cities. Marriage further served
Alexander as a bridge between policy and culture.
Alexander’s policies and decisions had profound consequences for the Greek and Persian
worlds. Unfortunately the record is at best incomplete and secondhand. Source analysis will
attempt to unravel the reliability of the historiography of the Alexander sources. After analyzing
the sources, this study will reconstruct the cultural and political milieu from which Alexander
emerged. Studying Alexander’s tutelage and early military experience are beneficial for creating
a more accurate assessment of his military and political policies.
This study is not a complete biography of Alexander the Great, nor does it hope to
disprove the conclusions or the emphases scholars have placed upon Alexander’s life and
actions; rather its purpose is to discern the motives behind his choices. Once motive has been
established it may be possible to remove the excess romanticism that permeates early scholarship
and the pessimism promoted by some modern scholars. A new characterization will be
constructed for Alexander of Macedon: the Pragmatic Alexander stripped of all the partiality for
either a negative or positive image mentioned above.
Modern Scholars: Tarn and Bosworth
Before attempting to unravel the classical traditions, it will be useful to introduce the
historiography and debate in modern scholarship over Alexander’s self-conception and how he
thought of his subjects. To oversimplify greatly, one side argues that Alexander strove to be a

4

benevolent patriarch, while the opposing viewpoint suggests that Alexander was a conqueror
with little regard for permanence.
The greatest proponent of the “noble Alexander” concept was William W. Tarn. Tarn
wrote in the early twentieth century and called Alexander’s policy one of “universalism.”
Possibly the most prolific modern opponent of this idea is A.B. Bosworth. Both Tarn and
Bosworth recognized the importance the Asian campaigns had on the governmental structure of
Alexander’s empire for Alexander developed his policies as he achieved more success. Tarn
argued Alexander sought to conquer Asia for the good of its people and Bosworth contended that
Alexander conquered for his sole benefit. Tarn focused mainly on Alexander’s intentions while
Bosworth almost exclusively emphasized the military aspects of the campaign.
W.W. Tarn uses the term universalism to summarize the Macedonian king’s actions in
Persia. Tarn’s thoughts on universalism derive from his interpretation of the Greek term
homonoia, which he attributed to the Athenian rhetorician Isocrates.5 Isocrates used this term in
his treatise The Panegyricus to describe the community of all Greek speakers. To simplify
Isocrates’ thoughts, speaking Greek separated an individual from the rest of the world.
Homonoia further signified Greek unity. Tarn defined homonoia as “a being of one mind
together.”6 As Tarn observes, homonoia was to be promoted among the Greeks to strengthen
their stance against the Persian king and his people. The Persians represent the “barbarian”
whom Isocrates viewed as a threat that continually loomed over Greece. Isocrates employed the
term homonoia when he sent correspondence to convince Philip of Macedon to lead the Greeks
to a victory over the Persian enemy.7 Alexander would later, argued Tarn, expand upon this

5
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concept to include the barbarian as a member of a universal family. If in this sense Alexander’s
homonoia would have been anathema to Isocrates, there are good reasons to expand the
definition. Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon states that homonoia can also mean “unity and
concord.”8 This definition of homonoia without Tarn’s romanticism is an acceptable label for
Alexander’s attempts at rule because it indicates cooperation. Tarn may have misused the term
because he follows Isocrates’ usage, and as will be revealed later, Alexander clearly did not
follow Isocrates’ proposals in the late campaign. Tarn’s scholarship, while immense in scope,
falls prey to hero worship at times and at other times makes frequent inferences into the thoughts
of Alexander that, at best, stretch the imagination, but does at least set the stage for exploring
Alexander’s intent.
On the other side of the debate, Bosworth does not share in Tarn’s depiction of Alexander
as the benevolent father figure. Rather, Bosworth portrays Alexander – in his role as king of
Asia – as having no thoughts other than exacting tribute from conquered peoples and expanding
his own reputation.9 Bosworth focuses on the military aspects of the campaign with particular
emphasis on any battle or massacre that occurred. He also makes Alexander seem driven to
exact revenge upon his opponents for the earlier Persian invasion of Greece in 490 BC.10 This
notion of a war of revenge may have been an early device applied by Alexander to encourage
Greek support for the campaign, but it is not an adequate argument. Bosworth identifies an end
to this phase,11 but does not provide adequate explanation for why the campaign continued.
Alexander’s behavior does not change, according to Bosworth, which suggests that there is no
distinction between events before 330 and those that came after it. If Alexander, in fact, did not
8
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make any changes during the campaign, how could there be an end to the “war of revenge”?
Bosworth’s analysis of Alexander can be summed up in one word, conquest.
Tarn and Bosworth contribute much to the base of knowledge concerning the actual
events and impacts of Alexander’s campaign. However, their conclusions, while useful,
ultimately differ when interpreting the motivations and decisions of Alexander. Modern scholars
spend much time debating Tarn’s interpretation versus Bosworth’s. For the purpose of this
thesis one must ask: does Tarn’s glorification of Alexander weaken our faith in his conclusions
on Alexander’s ideal of universalism? Tarn, while creating a heroic persona for Alexander in his
narrative, does not venture into unsubstantiated speculation when analyzing the sources. His
analysis is concise and critical but perhaps too hopeful in its attempt to paint a picture of the
noble Alexander. For example, Tarn glosses over many massacres that occurred during
Alexander’s campaign. But if Tarn dismisses these atrocities, Bosworth dwells too heavily on
them. Bosworth focuses on battles, troop dissent and the overall effectiveness of Alexander’s
conquest of the Persian Empire. By ignoring Alexander’s intent, Bosworth’s history is at best
incomplete or too one-sided. These historians are nevertheless useful because they represent the
stark divide that has surfaced within the modern debate.
Other modern scholars weigh in on the issue as well. Notable names include: Charles
Robinson, N.G.L. Hammond, Ernst Badian, Eugene Borza, as well as Janos Harmatta and A.
Shapur Shahbazi coming from Eastern Europe and the Middle East, who offer a new perspective
of Alexander’s eastern campaign not often seen in western scholarship.12 Harmatta’s and
12

Robinson, Charles.“The Extraordinary Ideas of Alexander the Great”. The American Historical Review 62, no. 2
(1957): 326-344.; Hammond N,G.L., Three Historians of Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983.; Badian, Ernst. “The Administration of the Empire.” Greece and Rome, 2d ser., 12, no.2 (1965): 166182.; Borza, Eugene. In the Shadow of Olympus “The Emergence of Macedon.” Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990.; Harmatta, Janos. “Alexander the Great in Central Asia,” Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 39, no. ¼ (1999): 129-136.; Shahbazi, A. Shapur. “Irano-Hellenic Notes 3: Iranians and Alexander”.
AmericanJournal of Ancient History 2, no.1 (2003): 5-38.
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Shahbazi’s contributions will be explained in the discussion of Alexander and the far-eastern
inhabitants of the Persian Empire.
Robinson, a late contemporary of Tarn, began writing about Alexander in the mid
twentieth century and continued to be a strong proponent of the benevolent or “humanitarian”13
Alexander. He in some way advanced Tarn’s legacy, but made several attempts to clear away
the romanticism through comparative studies of the sources. Both Hammond and Badian try to
strike a balance between the Tarn and Bosworth traditions. Badian seems sympathetic with the
harried figure of Darius but does not allow this to affect his analysis of Alexander’s actions.
Hammond seems much attached to the tradition of Tarn, and offers a fresh look at the
importance of Tarn’s primary sources, Plutarch and Arrian. Borza’s scholarship is at times
provocative and very critical of any action taken by Alexander that was not grounded in
Macedonian tradition. Each of these scholars contributes to the patchwork of Alexander’s life
and is indicative of the varying interpretations of the limited sources available.
During the years that Greco-Macedonian forces marched within the Persian Empire, a
shift in Alexander’s policies occurred. In the beginning of the invasion Alexander acted to
secure the eastern Mediterranean from maritime threats. The Greek mainland’s security as well
as that of the Ionian cities was secured from Persian naval forces in this first phase of
Alexander’s campaign. Although Alexander held the coastal zones and Egypt firmly in hand,
thus signifying an end to the threat of the Persian navy, he marched on Persia proper. Why
would he do this?
At first glance this looks far from pragmatic on Alexander’s part, but further
consideration of his situation will shed light on this decision. After the Battle of Issus in 333 BC,

13
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Alexander had, in his hands, the royal family of Darius. This prompted the Persian king to offer
settlement of all Persian lands west of the Euphrates River to Alexander in an attempt to regain
his relatives. It may seem wholly acceptable for a king simply meaning to secure control of the
coast to accept this offer. Alexander, ever the military thinker saw the danger in such an offer.
Badian assists saying Alexander “could not consider such terms. Once he gave up his hostages,
Darius would be free to prepare for an attack, which would come at any time. Whatever
boundary Alexander accepted, he would have to hold it… against the inevitable attack.”14
Alexander did not possess enough men to provide a sufficient defense over such a large area, and
he could not begin to consider that Darius would simply abandon his holdings along the eastern
Mediterranean. The threat of Darius would not go away and Alexander had to deal with it, but
he would go on his own terms not those of Darius. Badian concludes this reasoning with
“[Alexander’s] very success had made it impossible for him to stop.”15
By 330 BC Alexander had acquired control over two of the empire’s largest cities,
Babylon and Susa. 16 From this point he began to employ three major policies to strengthen his
position within Persia in order to establish and maintain a new realm. This thesis explores these
policies and how they were used to rule the newly subjugated peoples. The historical traditions
which preserved Alexander’s life and deeds will be examined as well. Alexander’s pragmatism
at rule is exemplified in this second phase of the conflict. Alexander maintained his policies to
ingratiate himself, both politically and ethnically, with the populace, and as a result this policy he
established cities to secure the eastern fringes of the empire, and he further made alliances with
neighboring kingdoms within India to increase his border security. Some ancient sources and
14

Badian, Ernst, 257-258. “Darius III”. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol.100 (2000): 241-267.
Ibid. 258.
16
See chapter 2 below for a discussion of the motivations for the initial forays by Philip II into Persian lands.
Alexander would follow his father’s lead in the beginning but it is unclear where Philip would have stopped and
Alexander continued on.
15
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modern scholars view Alexander being acculturated by his success. His change in appearance
and deference to non-Greeks was seen in a negative light as a symptom of a form of “hubris.”
One thing is plain: Alexander refused to be bound by convention. Arguably, he was only
seeking the most practical way to bring the Hellenic and Eastern cultures together under one rule.

10

Chapter 1
Classical Sources

The extant knowledge of Alexander the Great is derived from five classical secondary
sources: Arrian, Diodorus Siculus, Justin, Plutarch, and Quintus Curtius Rufus. It should be
noted that none of the classical secondary authors was a contemporary of Alexander. To
properly understand Alexander the Great it is necessary to extrapolate from the sources a sense
of where they gathered their information. Uncovering the origins of Alexander scholarship will
give insight into the quality of the sources we possess.
Thus the classical sources can be grouped into two or (counting Plutarch as a unique
case) three categories. Lucius Flavius Arrianus,17 probably writing his history early in the
second century AD, represents the tradition of Ptolemy and Aristobulus and therefore, the work
of Callisthenes, who served Alexander as the official historian of the Asian campaign.
Callisthenes’ history will be discussed in detail below. To modern historians, Arrian is arguably
the most important of the Alexander-historians. Arrian utilized a very analytical approach in an
attempt to produce a historically accurate depiction of the life of Alexander thus; Arrian’s benefit
to modern historians is easily seen since he clearly identified his sources and assessed the
significance of each. 18

17

“Arrian of Nikomedeia (Lucius Flavius Arrianos Xenophon, c. AD 80-160), a Greek from Bithynia who held
office under the Romans…”from Graham Shipley, The Greek World After Alexander (New York: Routledge,
2000), 6f.
18
Arrian was not unwilling to diverge from his use of Aristobulus and Ptolemy, however. He clarifies, “I have also
recorded some statements made in other accounts not entirely untrustworthy, but only of tales told of Alexander.”
Arr. Anab.1.
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W.W. Tarn places Plutarch of Chaeronea -- born circa AD 50 ─ while a biographer not a
historian, in his own category.19 Tarn argued that Plutarch’s greatest benefit to understanding
Alexander’s life is:
the personal part, Alexander himself and his character it is this part which constitutes the
claim of Plutarch’s Life to be something better than just another ‘vulgate’ document.
Much of this part is found nowhere else, and a good deal is extremely valuable, though
there are stories which are both untrue and silly.20
Plutarch, though at times convoluted, utilized similar sources to Arrian and provides a detailed
retelling of those events. His verbose descriptions of the events create a vivid image for readers,
and though entertaining, must be viewed with a critical eye. Plutarch’s writing mirrors Arrian’s
history closely as a result of a correlation of quite a few events21 that are not seen in the so called
“vulgate” tradition.
Curtius, Justin, and Diodorus do not adhere to the tradition followed by Arrian, nor do
they follow the compelling character-driven biographical work of Plutarch. The vulgate
tradition, as we will now call the work of these authors, is filled with long, eloquent speeches and
social commentary that modern historians identify as problematic. The vulgate is not altogether
useless and suggests another line of sources, but these are not well known and should be viewed
cautiously. It must be noted that Justin, unlike the others, wrote an epitome of a completed
history. This was taken from the work of Pompeius Trogus – this history no longer exists and is
linked to this vulgate tradition due to its strong similarity to the works of Curtius and Diodorus.
Whether one should follow the first tradition or the vulgate is a widely debated topic, and
this thesis does not desire to refute or prove the validity of either tradition, but simply to
19

“Plutarch’s Life [of Alexander] cannot be classed either with the ‘good’ tradition or with any of the traditions
which go to make up the so-called vulgate; it stands by itself.” Tarn, 297.
20
Tarn, 297.
21
For a nice comparative layout of related events of Alexander’s Asian campaign as recorded by the classical,
secondary sources see Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., The Ephemerides of Alexander’s Expedition (Providence:
Brown University, 1932), 15-68.
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introduce the aspects of each tradition that are most helpful in assessing the policies and ideas of
Alexander. If one tradition must be named as more accurate than another the Ptolemaic and
Aristobulian traditions as reported by Arrian would have to be considered the best. It should be
admitted that neither Arrian’s nor any of the Alexander historians can be taken at face value as
being wholly factual. However, to qualify this statement, it should be noted that Arrian seems to
have had at his disposal these first-hand accounts, which on some level must be considered more
reliable than the others. More will be said on these and the other sources below.
Fragmentary Primary Sources
The earliest known historical compilations concerning the Asian expedition have been
traced back to the very beginning of the Persian campaign. One was essentially a daily journal
of the events unfolding during the campaign; the other was a historical narrative constructed
from this daily log. Alexander employed official recorders during his conquest of Asia. Their
assignment was to create a record of Alexander’s accomplishments for posterity. Charles
Robinson Jr. identified this official compilation as:
a record of the day’s events, called the Ephemerides, [which] was under the supervision
of Eumenes of Cardia and Diodotus of Erythrae. The other was a finished history, based
on the Ephemerides, compiled by Callisthenes of Olynthus.22
Both the official history and Ephemerides were compiled during the campaign itself. These were
not the only primary sources, however; other unofficial accounts will be briefly mentioned later.
Callisthenes is noted several times in Arrian as well as Plutarch. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that, in the least, both Arrian and Plutarch had access to the primary source
material.

22
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Undoubtedly the most pressing concern of scholarship with regards to Alexander the
Great is determining the validity of these ancient sources. None of Alexander’s primary sources
has survived. When considering authors such as Callisthenes, Eumenes, and Diodotus one can
make relatively safe assumptions on their authority. These works were the eyewitness accounts
recorded as events unfurled. It could be argued that these official reports may have contained
omissions in favor of the Macedonian king, of perhaps those events or deeds that could have
damaged his reputation, but it is impossible to judge the extent to which this may have occurred.
Unfortunately these primary sources only exist as fragmentary remains and quotations in
later works. By critically examining extant fragments one may arrive at a relatively safe
assessment of their worth. The primary significance of these authors is found in what one would
assume to be very detailed accounts of the daily actions of Alexander, whether they were
military actions, religious duties, or political decrees.
Callisthenes
Evidence suggests that Callisthenes is the most important of the Alexander sources. His
official history must assuredly have provided the main source material for the later histories
written by Ptolemy and Aristobulus. 23 While the works of Callisthenes have not survived, their
importance cannot be denied. It is unclear whether or not Arrian had a copy of the official
history in his possession but when referring to Callisthenes, Arrian, attributed his information
almost exclusively to Ptolemy and Aristobulus, thus creating a connection between those sources
and the work of Callisthenes.
The following quotation from Arrian introduces Callisthenes and also gives readers an
illustration of his somewhat outspoken character:

23

Robinson, 11.
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Callisthenes of Olynthus, a past pupil of Aristotle, and with something of a boor in his
character, did not approve of this24, and here I myself agree with Callisthenes; on the
other hand I think Callisthenes went beyond reason, if the record is true, in declaring that
Alexander and his exploits depended on him and his history; it was not he who had come
to win fame from Alexander, but it would be his work to make Alexander renowned
among men; and again, that Alexander’s share in divinity did not depend on Olympias’
invention about his birth, but on the account he would write and publish in Alexander’s
interest.25
The value of such a character assessment can help to produce an understanding of the
relationship between Alexander and Callisthenes. It could be surmised that Callisthenes wrote a
fairly accurate history due in part to the daily journal of events he had to consult. Furthermore,
there is no mention by sources that Alexander had any direct input or influence on the official
history. Therefore it is probable that the history that Callisthenes constructed was indeed
accurate, but it is useful further to explore the relationship between him and Alexander to get a
better sense of his abilities as a writer and to substantiate the claim to his accuracy.
It should be noted that Arrian is not the sole source for information concerning
Callisthenes. Other valuable sources contain a small amount of information on Alexander’s
relationship with Callisthenes, primarily in the context of the events that led to the latter’s death.
These sources offer support to Arrian’s earlier assessment of Callisthenes26 and also serve to
introduce new aspects of his character.
Plutarch gives a similar characterization to that found in Arrian. During a formal
banquet, Alexander requested a speech from Callisthenes praising the Macedonians.
Callisthenes responded “so eloquently that the guests rose to applaud and threw their garlands at

24

Arrian is referring to Callisthenes’ chagrin at Alexander’s favor of Persian and Median styles of dress.
Arr. Anab. IV.10.1-3.
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him.”27 After such a favorable response, Alexander asked Callisthenes to list the shortcomings
of the Macedonians:
Callisthenes then turned to the other side of the picture and delivered a long list of home
truths about the Macedonians, pointing out that the rise of Philip’s power had been
brought about by the divisions of the Greeks, and quoting the verse ‘Once civil strife has
begun, even scoundrels may find themselves honoured.’ This speech earned him the
implacable hatred of the Macedonians, and Alexander remarked that it was not his
eloquence that Callisthenes had demonstrated, but his ill will towards them.28
Plutarch’s account correlates with Arrian fairly well in this case.
The remaining classical sources present differing depictions of Callisthenes from those of
Arrian and Plutarch. This divergence of views seems to indicate the application of other sources.
Their divergent source material will be discussed later. It is useful to compare the image of
Callisthenes found within these sources to better determine if their sources were common or if
their conclusions were of their own construction.
Justin’s depiction of Callisthenes is useful for it illustrates the transformation of the
relationship between Alexander and Callisthenes. Callisthenes is credited for convincing
Alexander to stop fasting due to his grief over the murder of one of his most trusted companions,
Cleitus, and return to his troops.
The entreaties of the philosopher Callisthenes proved especially effective; he was on
intimate terms with Alexander because they had both been pupils of Aristotle, and he had
also been invited by the king to be the author of the latter’s chronicles.29
This is a more amicable relationship than recorded in other sources.30 However, it can be seen
simply as an earlier depiction of a relationship that was not immune to change.

27

Plut. Alex. 53.
Ibid. 53.
29
Alexander fasted for four days, and only returned to normalcy at the behest of Callisthenes and the troops. Justin
The Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus 12.6.15-17.
30
Plutarch records this event in a much more unfavorable light than Justin, Plut. Alex. LIL.4.; Arrian does not give
the implication that Callisthenes went to offer succor to Alexander at all, but rather Anaxarchus the sophist,
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Callisthenes is ultimately put to death for his candor as seen in other sources: “The most
outspoken of the objectors31 was Callisthenes, and this spelled death for him and many
prominent Macedonians, who were all executed, ostensibly for treason.”32 Thus Justin presents a
relationship that rested on Alexander’s favor and that ultimately ended when Callisthenes fell
from it.
Quintus Curtius Rufus probably wrote his history during the first or second century of the
Roman Empire. He is yet another classical source who acknowledged Callisthenes and his role
in the camp of Alexander. Curtius provided a detailed diatribe supposedly delivered by
Callisthenes, wherein he disavows the prospect of Alexander’s transition to godhood.33 The
speech that Callisthenes gave, if it is recorded as it actually occurred, illustrates his influence and
skill as a rhetorician.34 Curtius’ use of speeches is problematic and indicative of the vulgate
tradition’s tendency to compose complex rhetorical passages that are impossible to verify.
What is most beneficial about Curtius’ inclusion of Callisthenes in his history of
Alexander is the description of the events that led to Callisthenes’ death and the indication that
he too probably utilized a different source. Callisthenes, as portrayed by Curtius, is not so much
a traitor but rather an outspoken proponent of traditional Greek customs whose rhetoric swayed
the troops to dissension.
Callisthenes was heard with approval as the champion of public freedom. He had
extracted not only silent agreement from his audience but vocal support as well,
especially from the older men who were offended by the substitution of foreign customs
for their established traditions.35
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Curtius depicts Callisthenes as neither the arrogant egotist portrayed by Arrian, nor the toocritical speaker shown by Plutarch, nor is he the friend turned hapless victim as observed in
Justin; he appears to be an official who, by maintaining traditional Greek principles, finds
himself out of Alexander’s favor. One item of further consideration, when discussing Curtius’
distinctly different depiction of Callisthenes, is that he probably did not use Ptolemy and
Aristobulus as sources, indicating his possible use of a differing source.
Diodorus Siculus wrote a universal history within which the death of Callisthenes was
included, but unfortunately this section has not survived. The only record that we have of this is
found in the table of contents of his universal history.36 While it is not known what Diodorus
wrote in regards to Callisthenes one can speculate that he may have shared a similar source to
Curtius. It is safe to make such a claim because neither Curtius nor Diodorus cites or makes any
direct reference to Ptolemy and Aristobulus.
Eumenes of Cardia
Regrettably, in contrast to Callisthenes there exists no record of the actual contribution by
Eumenes of Cardia and Diodotus of Erythrae. Both authors, mentioned previously, were
responsible for the compilation of the daily journal of events titled Ephemerides. Diodotus, in
fact, receives almost no mention in the sources at all. It is only through later historical
exploration that the contribution of Diodotus is even mentioned.37
Eumenes had a much more illustrious career38 and no one source gives as much attention
to Eumenes as does Plutarch.39 Plutarch’s account, reminiscent of nearly every other classical
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source, makes small mention of Eumenes’ function as a royal secretary;40 rather, Eumenes’ later
military exploits garner nearly the entire focus. Plutarch pursued Eumenes in two ways.
Similarly to Arrian’s detailed depiction of Callisthenes’ relationship to Alexander, Plutarch
illustrated the conflicts between the two men, but he also included the way in which Alexander
honored Eumenes. It is because of Eumenes’ contribution to the daily journal which ultimately
served Callisthenes’ official history that he becomes important for this study.
Alexander’s relationship with his secretary could have colored the content of Eumenes’
writing, so it becomes necessary to explore the relationship further. The way in which
Alexander honored those he favored is evident in 324 BC at Susa where he gave in marriage, to
each of his most loyal troops, the hand of a Persian princess. “In the distribution of the Persian
ladies amongst his captains, Alexander gave Apame, one of his sisters, to Ptolemy, and another,
also called Barsine, to Eumenes.”41 Plutarch further extolled the virtue of Eumenes’ character
with a detailed comparison to the character of the Roman general Sertorius.42
Eumenes is also reported by Plutarch to have been in conflict with Alexander’s dearest
friend, Hephaestion. In the following passage Plutarch gives some sense of the ingenuity of
Eumenes when he distracted Alexander from punishing him:
But Hephaestion dying soon after, the king, in his grief, presuming all those that differed
with Hephaestion in his lifetime were now rejoicing at his death, showed such harshness
and severity in his behaviour with them, especially towards Eumenes, whom he often
upbraided with his quarrels and ill language to Hephaestion. But he[Eumenes], being a
wise and dextrous courtier, made advantage of what had done him prejudice, and struck
in with the king’s passion for glorifying his friend’s memory, suggesting various plans to
do him honour, and contributing largely and readily towards erecting his[Hephaestion’s]
monument.43
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This passage has multiple benefits; it provides a sense of the cunning character of Eumenes, his
relationship to the king and a sense of the temperament of Alexander.
Similar accounts of Eumenes are found in each of the five major classical sources. Since
these versions generally agree we can infer that Eumenes had a very intimate knowledge of the
campaign, and this inference gives weight to his contribution to, and consequently the validity
of, the Ephemerides.
The time at which Eumenes’ duties as chronicler were superseded by his role as military
campaigner is unknown. However we do know that he was given command of three hundred
cavalry as early as 326 BC.44 One could speculate that when Eumenes was unable to write due
to military actions, Diodotus may have taken up the pen. This may be speculation; however, one
must assume that a daily itinerary would have been very difficult for Eumenes to produce amidst
the many military actions in which he participated. Therefore, it is not an unsafe proposition to
assume that Diodotus served to record events for that very reason.
There is at present no way to tell which parts of the journal were composed by Eumenes
and which by Diodotus. What is important is not the act of compilation but the end result of this
collaboration; what would later become the official history of Alexander’s expedition: a history
taken and compiled by Callisthenes.
Ptolemy I and Aristobulus
In the decades following Alexander’s death, two significant historical works came into
being. Aristobulus, who served with Alexander, created the first account, according to W.W.
Tarn.45 King Ptolemy I later wrote46 a memoir of the time he spent in the service of Alexander.
Each figure was present during Alexander’s Persian expedition but did not write until much later.
44
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In all probability both referred to Callisthenes’ history as a source. Both histories have been lost
and are only discernible through the direct references made by three of the five extant sources.
Although Aristobulus is thought to have produced his history before Ptolemy, he is of secondary
importance next to the Egyptian King. The greater frequency with which the classical secondary
sources cite Ptolemy as compared to Aristobulus indicates one of two things: either they did not
have easy access to Aristobulus’ history, or they did not find his history to be as reliable a
resource as that of Ptolemy.
Arrian cites Ptolemy many times. One such citation concerns the Battle of Issus late in
the year 333 BC. “So that Ptolemy son of Lagos, who was then with Alexander, says that the
pursuers of Darius meeting a deep gully in the pursuit crossed it over bodies of the dead.”47
Arrian makes several more references to Ptolemy indicating that he (Ptolemy) was an
authoritative source, at least in Arrian’s estimation.
Key sources such as Plutarch and Quintus Curtius Rufus attest to the importance of
Ptolemy as a primary source. The following excerpt from Plutarch indicates that he had at least
consulted a version of Ptolemy’s memoir: “But King Ptolemy puts them at thirty thousand foot
and five thousand horse…”48 While not a lengthy citation, this serves to reinforce the general
argument above.
Curtius cites Ptolemy’s correction to Cleitarchus’ and Timagenes’49 depiction of his
attendance at the battle of Sudracae:
According to Cleitarchus and Timagenes, Ptolemy (who was subsequently a king) took
part in this battle. Ptolemy himself, however, certainly from no desire to detract from his
own reputation, records that he was not there, since he had been sent on an expedition.50
47
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Both Plutarch and Curtius51 include many examples of Ptolemy’s exploits in their histories.
It is unclear to what extent the sources, when they mention Ptolemy, are relying on the
official histories written by Callisthenes. A certain number, it may be assumed, used the later
memoirs of Ptolemy for information. As mentioned, Ptolemy wrote these memoirs several
decades following Alexander’s Asian expedition and is thought to have utilized Callisthenes’
official history to assist in this writing. It is not unreasonable to assume that Ptolemy may have
overstated his role in certain events. Even so, however, this does not detract from his importance
as a source. Although both Justin and Diodorus included Ptolemy in their histories, neither
identifies him as a source,52 which suggests the use of another source.53
The other historian contemporaneous to Alexander is Aristobulus. Aristobulus wrote an
official history, sanctioned by Alexander, which, like Ptolemy, may have relied on the works of
Callisthenes as a definitive reference. Unfortunately, the only evidence of his writing is
fragmentary. Aristobulus is cited many times in Arrian, and Plutarch uses him as well.
Arrian’s citations impart a sense that Aristobulus was present and actually witnessed the
events. The following excerpt concerning the famous Gordian knot incident is attributed directly
to Aristobulus: “Some say he struck it with his sword, cut the knot, and said it was now
untied─but Aristobulus says that he took out the pole-pin, a bolt driven right through the pole,
holding the knot together, and so removed the yoke from the pole.”54 Arrian cited Aristobulus
several times in his Anabasis and even stated in the preface that he would weigh the validity of
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his sources55 against one another. Hereby Arrian reveals his critical approach to constructing his
history. In the preface of the Anabasis he writes:
Wherever Ptolemy son of Lagus and Aristobulus son of Aristobulus have both given the
same accounts of Alexander son of Philip, it is my practice to record what they say as
completely true, but where they differ, to select the version I regard as more trustworthy
and also better worth telling.56
The latter portion of this passage is a bit disconcerting. Arrian gives no qualification for the
method he employs to determine what source is more trustworthy. Without the source material
utilized by Arrian we must rely on his judgment as to the value of each.
Plutarch, while utilizing Aristobulus as a source, does not employ him to the same extent
as Arrian. In fact Plutarch only cites Aristobulus in passing in two instances. Here Plutarch
gives a brief description of Alexander’s ambition: “relying only on the thirty thousand foot and
four thousand cavalry which were his; for, according to Aristobulus, that was the full extent of
their number.”57 Plutarch’s further reference to Aristobulus is even more scant. What these
citations do indicate, however, is that Plutarch may have possessed a copy of Aristobulus’
history to consult even if he did not make thorough use of it.
The exclusion of direct citations of Ptolemy and Aristobulus by both Diodorus and
Curtius presents an interesting dilemma: if they did not have access to copies of Ptolemy’s or
Aristobulus’ histories, upon whom or what did they draw? They must have had another source,
which would indicate that Eumenes, Diodotus, Callisthenes, Aristobulus and Ptolemy were not
the only primary sources for Alexander’s life and military career. Who were the remaining
sources, what was their significance, and what role, if any, did they play?
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The Sources of the Vulgate

The remaining sources represent what is known as the vulgate tradition. The so-called
vulgate sources wrote using primarily the works of Cleitarchus and Diyllus.58 N.G.L. Hammond
argued that Diodorus and Curtius utilized Diyllus as the main source for the events occurring in
mainland Greece found in their histories.59 It would seem that Curtius, Justin (Trogus), and
Diodorus then employed Cleitarchus as their primary source for those events in Asia wherein
Alexander was prominent. Cleitarchus may have been the major source but he was not used
exclusively.
C. Bradford Welles indicates that “Diodorus ‘follows’ one or another of the
contemporaneous historians of Alexander.”60 Among these are Callisthenes, Aristobulus,
Cleitarchus, and Onesicritus. It is unlikely that Diodorus had direct access to the work of
Callisthenes and Aristobulus since he does not cite them directly. If he did possess these sources
he may have not had much faith in their authenticity or relevance, however this is purely
speculation. He probably followed the “other” sources, Cleitarchus and Onesicritus.
Other historians that may have also contributed to this “vulgate” tended to be obscure61
and held little significance to the Alexander history and therefore will not be mentioned. The
validity of the “vulgate” sources Onesicritus and Cleitarchus will be discussed further62,
however, when using the vulgate sources as evidence in the study of Alexander one must
proceed with caution.
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The only evidence of these “other” sources is found within the literary tradition of the
classical sources. These somewhat unreliable Alexander-historians were: Onesicritus, Nearchus,
and Cleitarchus.63 Classical sources only cite Nearchus and Onesicritus very briefly. For the
purpose of our paper, these sources will not be discussed at great length.64 Nearchus and
Onesicritus were contemporaries in the service of Alexander, while Cleitarchus probably wrote
decades after Alexander’s death.65 However it must be noted that their histories have been
discounted either for being full of falsehoods,66 or too anecdotal.
Waldemar Heckel postulated on the validity of Cleitarchus in the following excerpt from
his introduction to The History of Alexander:
Cleitarchus probably read and used the accounts of Onesicritus and Nearchus for
information on India [and] Cleitarchus supplemented these contemporary Alexanderhistorians with the eye-witness reports of Macedonians and Greeks, many of the latter
having served as mercenaries of the Great King.67
W.W. Tarn in his groundbreaking second volume of Alexander the Great made the following
assessment of Cleitarchus: “Cleitarchus had a taste for inventing, or adopting inventions of,
massacres…”68 This reference to Cleitarchus is important because it indicates a school of
thought doubting the validity of Cleitarchus’ usefulness as a source.
The primary importance of Cleitarchus seems to be in the widespread Roman audience
that had access to his work. For the Roman influence during the time of the vulgate writers is
63
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undeniable. This is revealed in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s letter to Marcus Caelius Rufus in 51
B.C. Cicero was on campaign at the time and had just crossed the Issus River when he
composed the letter. In it he mentions to Rufus his victory at the Issus and that he wrote from
“the place where, according to the story given you, as you have so often told me, by
Cl[e]itarchus, Darius was defeated by Alexander.”69 This information provided by Cicero seems
to indicate that the writings of Cleitarchus were in fairly wide circulation; or at least in the case
of Marcus Rufus, who was an aedile,70 the work seemed to be easily accessible. Cicero’s letter
shows either an ease at procuring this work by an aedile or that Marcus Rufus was a connoisseur
of rare books. Consequently this is telling of the vulgate tradition that seems to place so much
emphasis on the writings of Cleitarchus. One may assume that the vulgate sources made so
much use of Cleitarchus’ material simply because it was not difficult to find.
The final contemporaneous historical source of Alexander to be mentioned is Nearchus.
Nearchus is cited briefly by Arrian and very briefly in Justin’s Epitome.71 Through Arrian we
learn that Nearchus served as a commander of a contingent of Alexander’s troops.72 Plutarch
and Curtius mention Nearchus briefly.73 While Curtius and Plutarch refer to Nearchus in their
respective works neither cites him as a source.74
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There remains fragmentary evidence suggesting that still other writers of Alexander
existed. The importance of these “other” writers is minute and they do not contribute to the
material to be discussed in this thesis;75 consequently, those sources will not be mentioned.
The historiography of Alexander is formed from a complex amalgamation of source
fragments and conjecture. While one should not dismiss the vulgate sources as useless it should
be noted that for our purpose the works of Arrian are most beneficial. Cleitarchus and Diyllus
compose the bulk of the vulgate tradition and it has been shown that their numerous problems
override their value. The vulgate sources therefore will serve only briefly, as a qualitative and
comparative tool alongside the work of Arrian and Plutarch. The information derived from
Ptolemy I of Egypt seems to be of the greatest importance and those sources who utilize him the
most, Arrian and Plutarch, provide perhaps the most accurate depiction of Alexander’s life. This
detailed discussion of the sources will be become more relevant later when the ancient works are
used and sometimes misinterpreted by modern scholars.
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Chapter 2
Philip of Macedon: The Establishment of Power and the Tutelage of Alexander

Alexander’s larger than life image often overshadows the critical contributions made by
his father Philip II. Philip set the stage for Alexander’s rise to prominence and thus deserves
thorough exploration. Without Philip there would be no Alexander. Macedonia, before the
kingship of Philip II, was a fairly disjointed and insignificant collection of small villages and
minor urban centers. No strong centralized government existed although previous Macedonian
kings had minted coinage in attempts to consolidate power. The most significant fact concerning
Macedon is its strategic location on the Aegean and the material resources it contained. Any
land force going from Greece to Persia or vice versa had to travel through southern Macedon.
As advantageous as the manpower and natural resources of Macedon could be to others, it was
not until Philip that these resources were fully utilized for a Macedonian government.
Philip ascended the Macedonian throne in the tumult that followed the death of his father
Amyntas III in 370 BC. Philip’s two older brothers Alexander II and Perdiccas III were both
made king and subsequently killed before Philip took his place as king of Macedon in 359.
The onset of Philip’s dominance over Macedonian government brought many changes.
He moved the rural land dwellers into civic centers and created new coinage. Hammond states
that this new currency was a marked divergence from the old silver and bronze coins minted by
the previous Macedonian kings. By manufacturing new coins the king increased his power
exponentially because “Philip and Alexander owned all deposits of gold, silver, copper, iron, and
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other minerals.”76 Consequently Philip could extract profit and control the supply of material
from his own land holdings.
In order to buttress his position as king, Philip set about eliminating the many rival tribes
and minor kings surrounding the Macedonian frontier. This was Philip’s first diplomatic test.
He was so successful that “six months later all rivals for the throne had been dismissed from the
field and apart from the Illyrians all Philip’s dangerous neighbors had been conciliated.”77
Philip’s skill as a statesman is evident early on in his career and would be emulated by his son,
Alexander III, years later.
The military innovations imposed by Philip were essential for the emergence of the
Macedonian army as a power. In Macedon, before Philip, there existed no professional army but
merely a ragtag assembly of undisciplined fighters. The new king would change the old system
by creating a professionally trained army in the service of the king of Macedon.
Philip introduced a new type of rapid warfare to the Greeks. The Macedonian combat
force consisted of a combination of phalanx units in the center and cavalry units on either side.
Cavalry emphasis on disrupting and flanking enemy ranks remained a key component of Philip’s
battle tactics.
Indisputably the Macedonians’ speed in battle allowed for the advances made over the
Greek forces in the early years of Philip’s rule. In addition the Macedonian infantry and cavalry
now employed the sarissa, a long thrusting weapon probably adapted from the spears found in
the Theban phalanx. At over five meters in length, the sarissa gave unprecedented reach and
killing power to the phalanx and cavalry. This added a new dimension to the combined use of

76

Hammond, N.G.L.. The Macedonian State: “Origins, Institutions, andHistory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989, 179.
77
Errington, R. Malcolm. A History of Macedonia, Translated By Catherine Errington.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 39.

29

infantry and cavalry units. The foot soldiers were able to penetrate and delay the approaching
enemy phalanx with more destructive force, clearing the way for the horsemen.
In his study on Macedonian arms, Minor Markle suggests, “Philip’s combination of the
use of the cavalry lance [sarissa] with the wedge formation was specifically designed to cut
through a phalanx of Greek hoplites.”78 This appears to be an adaptation of an earlier Theban
tactic applied at the battle of Leuctra.79 Charles D. Hamilton’s description of the battle indicates
that the Theban cavalry charged through an opening in the front line of the Spartans and wreaked
havoc among the infantrymen.80 Philip would later be a political hostage in Thebes81 and in all
probability became acquainted with the Thebans’ military tactics.
The consolidation of Macedonia under one ruler was of primary importance for the new
king. Philip utilized the combined forces of cavalry and hoplite infantry and swiftly conquered
those areas of Macedonia not under his control. At this time Macedonia was separated into two
distinct geographic regions: the highlands and lowlands. Traditionally the highland tribesman
had been very independent and not influenced strongly by Macedonian control. The lowlands
were the center of Macedonian urbanism and much more inclined to central rule.
After putting down any significant military resistance in the highland region Philip set
out to place his governmental structures in his newly subdued territories. Philip endeavored to
“integrate the western principalities, above all Lynkestis, Pelagonia, Orestis and Tymphaia,
much more closely than ever before into the Macedonian state.”82
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Not wholly satisfied with what must have been a negative image seen by the conquered
tribes on the Macedonian periphery, Philip entered into the first of many marriage alliances.
This was an act of ingenuity that would be employed by, and have major ramifications for, his
son Alexander later. The marriage pact acted as a bridge between culture and ideology. Philip
attempted to quell opposition to his new position of power by forming a union with women from
prominent families. In one such joining he married “Audata, the daughter of an Illyrian
noble.”83 This alliance however, did not have the desired outcome, for hostilities with Illyrians
persisted throughout Philip’s reign and into Alexander’s. Although this incident had a negative
result and he later forcibly restrained the Illyrians, Philip was not dissuaded and entered into
several more political marriages. This suggests a deep-seated faith in the merits of this policy.
Philip’s military and political ambitions were evident. Continual forays into Greece
clearly showed his desire for capturing new territory for Macedonia. He was not entirely
successful, being soundly defeated in two deadly encounters with the Phocian strategos
Onomarchus in 354 BC.84 Philip would rebound, however, at the Battle of the Crocus Field in
352 BC showing his military force would prove to be a juggernaut unable to be stopped. During
the course of the Third Sacred War Philip destroyed Phocis and later the city of Olynthus in 348
BC.
He would consolidate his power base over the next decade to the sorrow of his enemies.
Philip’s acquisition of lands and power has been treated in full by many historians and is not
necessary to discuss here. It is sufficient to mention the end result:

in a show of utter

superiority, Philip rode triumphantly from the plain of Chaeronea in August 338 BC. The
victory over the combined might of the Theban and Athenian contingent firmly cemented
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Philip’s claim to total lordship over the Greek world. Later that same year, Philip officially
became hegemon of the Greeks and head of the League of Corinth.
Philip’s purpose in forming the Corinthian League was to assure acquiescence from the
conquered Greek city-states. The result of the synedrion (meeting) was the limited autonomy of
the Greek cities in exchange for an oath of allegiance to Philip. During an address to the League
Philip announced his plans to invade Persia. This may have been the result of Philip’s
correspondence with the Greek sophist Isocrates.
Isocrates had been flattering to Philip through a number of letters urging him to take up
the mantle of hegemon and destroy the Persians. Isocrates saw in Philip the strength necessary
to unite the Greeks militarily and create the homonoia or concord necessary to defeat the
“barbarians” he so hated. Isocrates believed that there was no greater achievement for Philip
than defeating the Persians and continued the political flattery, “for then will naught be left for
you [Philip] except to become a god.”85 Later, Philip held a pan-Hellenic festival to celebrate the
marriage of his daughter, Cleopatra to “Alexander, king of the Molossians… [with] a lavish
parade including ostentatiously adorned statues of the twelve gods, along with a thirteenth –
likewise suitable for a god – of Philip himself.”86
One should not assume that Isocrates’ statement was the strongest factor behind such an
action but it does indicate that Philip had prepared to change his image radically among the
Macedonians and the Greeks. Here it is necessary to draw a distinction that many scholars have
failed to make. The tradition that Bosworth represents accuses Alexander of having the same
ambitions at godhead as those seemingly held by Philip. Alexander’s journey to the oracle of
Zeus-Ammon at the oasis of Siwah in 331 BC is the foundation for their stance. Cleitarchus
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indicates that Alexander was proclaimed the son of Zeus-Ammon at Siwah. It is impossible to
say whether or not Alexander was actually named son of a god at Siwah for no person was with
Alexander within the shrine. The main difference here, whether or not Alexander was
proclaimed or believed he was the son of a god, was that Philip presented himself as new god
among the pantheon of old. It could be argued that Philip was on the cusp of declaring his own
godhood as his new iconography suggested. As will be seen in a later chapter, however,
Alexander’s cooption of the Persian “god-king” imagery served not so much his own ego but
assured a better relationship with his Persian subjects. Alexander adopted a previous, and
common, Persian court policy which perhaps gave a sense of godhood; but unlike his father he
never overtly presented himself as Alexander the God to his Persian subjects: he was simply the
king.
It seems that Philip, having secured the Greek mainland, now sought to bring under his
control the only significant threat to his power, the Persian Empire. The Persians had
consistently sought to gain influence and power within Greek affairs. The noted Greek orator
Demosthenes entreated the Persian king for aid against Philip. Philip recognized the influence
and wealth that could be brought to bear against him and “in the spring of 336 BC, Philip had
asked [the Delphic oracle] ‘whether he would conquer the King of the Persians.’”87
The fame and wealth that would come from a successful invasion of Persia is easily
recognized. Such an invasion served Philip twofold; it provided a common ancestral enemy of
the Greeks, which could alleviate anti-Macedonian sentiment; furthermore the booty acquired
would be useful for the maintenance of his large armies. E. F. Bloedow speculates that the
invasion was both a war of revenge and a war of conquest simply because, “the war would by its
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very nature become a war of conquest, for it would scarcely be possible to punish the Persians
for the wrongs of 480 without conquering them.”88
There may have been other reasons for Philip’s desire to invade Persia: easy spoils and
security. F. W. Walbank lists as a contributing factor a passage from Polybius reasoning that
Philip’s plan to invade Persia resulted from “the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the
upper satrapies in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the
barbarians ventured to face them.”89 The perception of Persia as a weak or weak willed empire
was not new; Polybius simply promoted a tradition begun by the historian Herodotus. The need
for secure borders surely weighed heavily upon Philip. Persian forays into the Greek mainland
were not a distant memory and Philip could not stand for the potential threat. Only a decade
before the Persian king, Artaxerxes, had sought to interfere in Greek affairs. In 351 BC
Artaxerxes sent a large sum of silver to the Thebans to assist in their war with the Phocians.90
This was only a monetary contribution but, added to the various hostile moves against their
neighbors by the Persians, it appeared sinister. At this time Artaxerxes was attempting to capture
Egypt, Phoenicia and Cyprus. Philip sent his general, Parmenio, with a small exploratory force
into Asia Minor. Such a sortie would provide the necessary intelligence needed to judge the
capability of Persian resistance to an invasion.
It is unclear whether or not Philip would have attempted as did Alexander to subjugate
the entire Persian Empire, but it seems reasonable to suggest that an invasion led by Philip would
mirror Alexander’s early eastern Mediterranean campaign. P.A. Brunt disagrees: “the
Macedonians were not a maritime or commercial people, and it was natural for their king to
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entertain continental ambitions.”91 Brunt is correct in his assessment of Macedonian naval
strength but does not take into account the fact that the Macedonians could secure the seaboard
without naval means. The siege techniques of Philip could surely have subdued the coastal port
cities of Asian Minor and the Levant. Unfortunately, Philip could not make good on his plan for
an invasion. In 336, only one year after assuming the title of hegemon, Philip of Macedon was
assassinated at the very celebration that signaled his ascent to godhood.
The importance of Philip is unquestionable with regard to the life and upbringing of
Alexander. His innovations permeated all aspects of Macedonian life. Philip helped to urbanize
the Macedonian people, and brought Macedonia to the fore militarily. It goes without saying
that Alexander owed a debt of gratitude to Philip. Philip was responsible for the most critical
aspects of Alexander’s young life. Education, both philosophical and martial, was one of the key
components in Alexander’s youth and Philip was instrumental in securing the best teachers for
his son. Later, Philip himself became Alexander’s teacher in the way of cavalry warfare.
Without Philip there would have been no Alexander; thus Alexander’s debt to his father is clear.
Alexander’s Early Years
Alexander was born on July 20, 356 BC to Philip of the house of Amyntas and Olympias
of Epirus. Little is known about the early years of Alexander’s life; however, Plutarch’s account
of the young Alexander provides some pertinent background indicating an intelligent and
inquisitive character. One such description from Plutarch relates an encounter with a visiting
Persian envoy.
He talked freely with them and… did not trouble them with any childish or trivial
inquiries, but questioned them about the distances they had traveled by road,
the nature of the journey into the interior of Persia, the character of the king, his
experience in war, and the military strength and prowess of the Persians.92
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If only a fraction of Plutarch’s writing can be believed, Alexander was an exceptionally gifted
youth. To better recognize Alexander’s acuity one needs to understand the structure of the
young prince’s early education.
As crown prince to the Macedonian throne, Alexander received his education through
various tutors appointed by his father, Philip. As his schooling will indicate, Alexander may
have been ethnically Macedonian but his formal education, aside from military training, was
exclusively Greek. It appears that the most influential of these tutors was Aristotle. From
roughly 343/2-340 BC, Aristotle mentored the young Alexander on such diverse topics as
philosophy, rhetoric, literature, and the natural sciences.
It must be noted that the exact matter of Alexander’s tutoring sessions is unknown.
These were held, with a fair amount of secrecy, in the special precinct of Mieza93 provided by
Philip. Little evidence exists on the exact organization of the Aristotle’s instruction for
Alexander. However, one can reasonably surmise that the environment was not unlike Plato’s
Academy in Athens. Stewart postulated, “Alexander would have learned of Plato’s views on
kingship, power and knowledge…”94
Aristotle’s teachings almost certainly had a profound effect on the youth. Plutarch
indicates Alexander formed a bond with Aristotle. They developed a warm relationship, which
was closer than that shared by the father and son. Aristotle’s teachings will be explored in detail
later as a contributing factor in the governmental structure imposed by Alexander upon the
Persians.
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Alexander’s tutoring came to an end in 340 BC when he was required, at the age of
sixteen, to serve as Regent of Macedon while Philip was away on campaign. Regency was a
testament to the maturity and intelligence Alexander must have possessed in his youth. Plutarch
states that Alexander “During this period defeated the Maedi who had risen in revolt, captured
their city, drove out its barbarous inhabitants, established a colony of Greeks assembled from
various regions, and named it Alexandroupolis.”95
This marks the beginning of Alexander’s military and political career.
Alexander’s military successes ultimately led to favor, and later, tension, with his father.
After his victory over the Maedi, Alexander assumed a position of command on the left wing of
the Macedonian cavalry. As commander of the flank, Alexander was responsible for locating,
assessing and finally, exploiting weaknesses in enemy lines. The cavalry unit’s “speed against
disorganized infantry was devastating, and accounted for the decisive tactics in Macedonian
battles… [as seen in] Philip’s defeat of Bardylis in 358.”96
As Alexander’s experience in battle increased, so too did his importance to Philip.
Alexander later became second in command under Philip and played a key role in deciding the
outcome of the Battle of Chaeronea. During the battle Alexander is “said to have been the first
to break the line of the Theban Sacred Band.”97 Under Philip’s tutelage Alexander excelled as a
cavalry officer and brought about the undoing of their opponents’ defensive lines, which led to
the ultimate victory.
Battle tactics and skills were not the only training Alexander received serving under
Philip. Alexander was the beneficiary of Philip’s political abilities as well. Being an astute
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student, Alexander surely made note of the gains such policies produced. Two policies promoted
by Philip had definite implications for Alexander’s later career. These were the use of political
marriage pacts and the administration of conquered lands. Alexander employed these in earnest
and they will be discussed in a later chapter.
Upon Philip’s death, Alexander assumed the kingship of Macedon and set about
establishing his base of power there. Alexander immediately “assembled the Peloponnesian
Greeks and requested from them the leadership of the Persian expedition…”98 Alexander could
not immediately take up his new mantle of hegemon due to unrest in and near Macedon’s
borders. Before Alexander could turn to his international affairs, i.e. Persia, he had to secure his
base of power sufficiently to embark on an invasion.
Alexander would prove his ability as military commander throughout the initial stages of
his kingship. Uprisings among the Thracians, Triballians and Illyrians forced Alexander to
military action in the spring of 335. The independent-minded Thracians were the first to fall
under Alexander’s onslaught. Next Alexander encountered and routed the Triballians in ruthless
fashion where “three thousand [Triballians] perished in the flight.”99
Another barbarian tribe became involved in the unrest as well; these were the Getae. The
Getae were a Germanic tribe settled in Thrace, in close proximity to the Ister River. Arrian’s
account states that the Getae had a poorly fortified city and seems to suggest that Alexander saw
this as a target of opportunity. The Getae were put to flight and “did not even withstand the first
charge of the cavalry.”100 Their city was sacked and all of their possessions confiscated.
Next Alexander laid siege to Pellium, a city that was under the occupation of the Illyrian
king, Clitus. Arrian tells us that Clitus was in league with the king of the Taulantians, Glaucias.
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While besieging the city, Alexander was forced to deal with the army of Glaucias approaching
from the rear. The Macedonians beat a small retreat and waited patiently for an appropriate time
in which to mount an assault. Alexander ordered a nighttime raid on the combined forces of
Clitus and Glaucias and defeated them. Arrian reports that Alexander was denied the booty from
Pellium because Clitus “set fire to it and fled to Glaucias among the Taulantians.”101
Errington notes that the speed of the Macedonian military machine made possible the
manner in which the Macedonian forces were able to conquer these tribes. Surprise and sheer
force were of utmost importance for victory. The first example of Alexander employing such
tactics is illustrated by Plutarch’s description of his victory over the Maedi102 and subsequent
imposition of a colony and city on the conquered territory.
With Alexander preoccupied with the uprisings, Theban exiles entered Thebes and killed
the administrators Amyntas and Timolaus. This was in an attempt to reclaim the city from
Macedonian rule. Arrian suggests that the men “won readier trust from the populace by
affirming that Alexander had died in Illyria…”103 Upon hearing this news, Alexander, in
dramatic fashion, showed the speed of the Macedonian forces. In only thirteen days Alexander
stood outside the gates of Thebes. Alexander laid siege to Thebes and brought the city down.
The defenders were slaughtered wholesale and the city razed.
Prior to this rumors circulated among the Greek cities suggesting that Alexander had
been killed in battle. These rumors helped create the false sense of security that they were now
free from the Macedonian yoke. With both Philip and Alexander gone, cities in southern Greece
saw this as an opportunity to break from the Corinthian League. News of Thebes’ destruction
put an end to the majority of these revolts. Embassies were sent entreating Alexander to forgive
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their indiscretions. However, not all of the cities immediately yielded, forcing Alexander to
march upon them. Alexander throughout his life consistently showed great deference to cities
that freely submitted to him and great ferocity with those who mounted resistance. Nevertheless,
in nearly all cases of the Greek cities no blood was shed. This was a result of the sheer display
of force presented to the dissenters by Alexander and their subsequent surrender.
With the Greek cities sufficiently cowed Alexander became the official hegemon of the
Corinthian League. Philip had never made a secret of his plans to attack the Persians and
consequently, Alexander must have been very cognizant of these desires. After Philip’s death
though, the question arises: why did Alexander pursue the Persian invasion? Was it for heroic
glory, a trait he so appreciated in Achilles, the main figure of The Iliad, which he studied under
his mentor Aristotle, or merely to fulfill his father’s aims?
The continued threat of possible Persian interference in Greek affairs may have been
enough for Alexander to pursue the invasion. Evidence indicates that Alexander’s aim during
the first phase of the invasion of Persian soil was mainly to achieve strategic security.
Possible influence of Aristotle and Isocrates
During his youth Alexander learned that barbarians were destined to be ruled by their
betters. Aristotle believed that the Greeks were a superior race compared to the Persians.
Isocrates, while not contributing directly to Alexander’s education, was certainly expressing a
common viewpoint when – as in his letters to Philip – he called the Persians a “common enemy.”
After 330 BC, Alexander diverged from these influential figures’ teachings. However, the
influence of both Aristotle and Isocrates appears to have potentially affected the early campaign.
Examples of this influence are clear after Alexander entered the Levant from Greek Ionia. He
encountered for the first time a more wholly foreign citizenry than in Coastal Asia Minor, one
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with alien customs and appearances. By subjugating these totally he appears to be following an
agenda of conquest and control.
During the campaign when Alexander made his way through the Levant, Aristotle’s
influence cannot be ignored. It is not clear whether or not Alexander actually read Aristotle’s
treatise, The Politics. However, what must be assumed is that Alexander, during his four years
studying under Aristotle, probably learned his views on nature and on the nature of rule.
Aristotle’s influence is undeniable in one instance: Alexander allowed several biologists and
naturalists to accompany the expedition in order to take specimen samples for the philosopher.
His actions in the early campaign parallel Aristotle’s ideas on ruler and ruled. Aristotle states,
“even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition… both against wild
animals and against such of mankind as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to
submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by nature just.”104 This passage presents Aristotle’s
complex theories on race and nature. Whole groups of people may be born into a state of
subjection as dictated by nature. By following these concepts, Alexander was perfectly just in
acquiring the lands of lesser peoples through war. These people were by nature slaves and to
enslave them was by no means an injustice but rather a mechanism by which to return them to
their more natural state.
Alexander’s tactics when related to Aristotle’s political views are seen as good or noble
exploits. [For] “virtue when it obtains resources has in fact very great power to use force, and
the stronger party always possesses superiority in something that is good, so that it is thought
that force cannot be devoid of goodness…”105 Aristotle continues this line of reasoning and
concludes that the conqueror is just as long as it is natural for him to be, in fact, the conqueror.
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One such instance occurred in the city of Gaza. After conquering the eastern Mediterranean
seaboard Alexander brought his troops to bear on this fortified city. Arrian describes Gaza thus,
“Gaza was a large city, built on a high mound, with a strong wall round it.”106 The inhabitants of
Gaza refused to admit the army of Alexander into its walls. The men were massacred and all
women and children sold into slavery. If Alexander knew of this philosophical argument, he
would have felt justified in treating Persian people and cities so harshly.
The missives of Isocrates with Philip before and later with young Alexander highlight
another tradition of thought regarding the pursuit of honor, and the Greek view with regards to
Persians. Isocrates is a useful source because he indicates a sentiment present in the minds of the
Athenians, or at least what Isocrates believed was in the best interest of the Athenians. It is
unknown with whom Isocrates spoke concerning the imminent war against the Persians but one
is inclined to believe that he did not simply fabricate public opinion. The Greeks agreed that
nothing beyond a war with the Persians would be “more glorious [and] more useful to the
Greeks.”107 Isocrates wrote108 this letter to Philip after Chaeronea and its rhetoric was no
different after the death of Philip and the ascension of Alexander. For Isocrates there was
nothing more important than a leader to wage war on the Persians regardless of whether the
leader was Greek or Macedonian. Alexander’s initial harsh treatment of his enemies in the early
campaign and the singularity of his attempts at crushing the strategic operations of the Persians
mirror the quest for glory that Isocrates promotes. Although this may mirror Isocrates’ fondest
wish it does not indicate Alexander’s acceptance of Isocrates’ idea nor does he continue in this
way for long. Isocrates would have been appalled at Alexander’s later policy where inclusion of
the Persians, rather than subjugation, was the rule.
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Chapter 3:
Alexander in Action

Following his entry into the Troad in 334 BC Alexander set events in motion that would
result in an expanded Hellenic realm. At the beginning of his campaign it is not clear that
Alexander had any long-term goals in mind when considering Persia. The decision to pursue the
early campaign appears to be clearly concerned with logistics. Alexander, perhaps staying true
to the office of hegemon of the Greeks, set about freeing the Greek cities of Asia Minor from
Persian rule.
From a military and logistical standpoint the securing of Asia Minor with its many Greek
cities and close coastal proximity to mainland Greece and Macedonia was critical. Any hostile
Persian infantry force had to move its troops through Asia Minor and across the Hellespont to
threaten Macedonian interests.
The eastern Mediterranean coast served as the base of operations for the Phoenician naval
forces which, if left unmolested, could reach the Greek islands with relative ease. Therefore, it
was absolutely necessary for the invading Macedonians to keep the Hellespont and the coast
secure. The city of Tyre highlights Alexander’s need for a secure coastline. In a drawn out siege
Alexander continued to call for the surrender of Tyrian defenders. When he was repeatedly
rebuffed, Alexander accepted nothing but the utter destruction of the city and its inhabitants. An
unrelenting Alexander demonstrated the type of resolve that Isocrates so admired. Alexander
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followed this course throughout the Levant and into Egypt with the express purpose of
eliminating any maritime threat to Greece and his own Macedonian troops.
Governing Bodies and Procedure of the Early Campaign
One of the most significant policies put forth showcasing the sheer scope of Alexander’s
enterprise was the appointment of satraps over the various geographical areas of his new
kingdom. The sources are clear indicators of Alexander’s methodology in ruling a large area that
contained so many diverse ethnic groups. Rather than systematically destroying all vestiges of
the previous power structure Alexander incorporated a majority of the common practices.
A number of political appointments occurred throughout the newly acquired lands of
western Asia. These appointments can be seen as simply the most practical choices to make. By
appointing Persian satraps, or in many cases simply leaving them in their previous position of
power,109 Alexander was able to prevent the rise of dissent from the populace. For many
“Persians” day to day life did not change. All that changed was the knowledge that leadership
had been taken by an outsider.
One could argue that Alexander could have simply insinuated a Macedonian governor in
place of local leaders with little ill effect. In the campaign’s infancy he in fact did supplant
former satraps with Macedonian or Greek replacements. However, after the Battle of the
Granicus River in 334 BC, Alexander allowed that “the Sardians and the other Lydians were
granted the use of the old Lydian customs, and allowed to be free.”110 So, even at this early
point, the native peoples were granted their cultural identities and only endured a new governor.
Removing the Persian military presence in Asia Minor, Alexander appointed to his
closest allies the task of maintaining the security of the region. Amyntas was assigned the duty
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of securing the city of Sardis, while Asander, the brother of Parmenio, became governor over
Lydia for the purpose of holding Lydia secure. Alexander then set out to gain the favor of the
people in Asia Minor. He ordered, “Alcimachus… to the Aeolian cities and to any Ionian towns
still subject to the barbarians. [And] ordered the oligarchies everywhere to be overthrown and
democracies to be established…”111
These early actions are significant. They show that Alexander appeared to be not yet
interested in incorporating the inland Persian Empire into his own. Alexander was more intent
on securing defensive measures for the lands removed from Persian power. While some may
argue that by acquiring the lands of the eastern Mediterranean and Ionia Alexander exhibited a
desire for a larger empire, it is apparent that he did not yet have any grand stratagem for all of
Persia. With the threat of the Persian navy certainly diminished he could have made swift
advances deep into the Persian interior but chose not to, and continued with the total acquisition
and security of the coastline. With that knowledge we can cast doubt on the idea that through
this early foray into Persian territory Alexander had intended to be the ruler of Persia proper.
Some scholars such as N.G.L. Hammond prematurely characterize Alexander’s decisions
at this time and those after the fall of Darius in 330BC as being part and parcel of the same
strategy. “In the interior of Asia Minor, at last, we get a clue to Alexander’s thinking, for he
appointed barbarians, non-Greeks, as satraps of two provinces.”112 This is a hasty estimation.
Alexander did indeed make two early ‘barbarian’ satrapal appointments, but these are the
exception rather than the rule, and can be explained in terms of these two satrapies’ ethnic makeup and their strategic importance (or lack of it) to the defense of Asia Minor. The majority of the
city-dwellers in coastal Asia Minor, being ethnically Greek, had a vested interest in accepting a
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Greco-Macedonian appointed satrap and Alexander showed no inclination to totally subjugate
them.
In Asia Minor, the first appointment of a non-Macedonian or Greek official was given in
334 to Princess Ada of Halicarnassus.113 Although not purely Greek by blood, Ada was
thoroughly Hellenized. She does not fit Hammond’s image of foreign satrap and therefore
should not be used as a linkage between Alexander’s early and late policies. Alexander may
have seen merit in the structure of the satrapy but he did not show any inclination at this time to
allow a “true” Persian retention of leadership. His goals were to simply gain strategic control
over primarily the coastline. Furthermore, his appointment of Sabictas114 ─ another non-Greek─
was in the strategically empty province of Cappadocia which received almost no attention during
the entire campaign. The reason for this neglect was that Cappadocia was a fairly untamed land
that did not present a pressing problem to Alexander’s plans for security.
After securing Egypt, Alexander made the first real concerted effort to invade the Persian
interior. Once there he enacted three key policies to create and maintain his empire: the first in
manner of governance; the second in manner of dress and political iconography; the third in
political marriage.
His methods were an amalgamation of the previous policies and tactics enacted by Philip
II before him and his own rationalism. Philip may have given Alexander the impetus or rather
the very idea and tools to invade Persia, but he cannot be credited for the rapidity with which
Alexander was able to extend his empire. Alexander’s political and military creativeness has to
be credited for this accomplishment. The ancient sources provide a scattered account of these
events and the approach which Alexander took to hold the conquered at bay.
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Alexander enacted his three main policies after the final defeat and eventual death of the
Persian king Darius III who had been put to death by the order of Bessus, a Persian noble and
satrap of Bactria. With the Persian king dead Alexander stood poised to claim his prize and strip
the Persian Empire of any and all of its wealth. However, the sources show a pattern of behavior
and political cunning, late in the campaign, suggesting that Alexander meant to establish and
maintain a long-lasting, secure realm for Greek and barbarian alike.
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Chapter 4
Alexander’s First Three Persian Satraps and
The Road to a New Realm

Alexander abandoned the course of rule promoted by Isocrates and Aristotle that he
seemed to have followed in the early campaign. Greeks were freed from the Persian yoke and
democracies restored among the Ionian communities of Asia Minor. After 330 BC, however, he
demonstrated that their pre-conceptions of government or views of racial superiority were no
longer acceptable in his ruling ideology. It is clear that when Alexander recognized the defeat of
Darius was inevitable and began to co-opt the existing Persian lands into an empire of his own,
he understood that he could not simply consider the subjugated people as mere chattel. The
Macedonian military machine alone could not hope to maintain control over the vast land mass
that Alexander was now consolidating. Thus, Alexander set about creating a unique system of
governance. Alexander’s new system allowed Persian satraps to remain in their own
administrative capacity provided they continued to remain obedient.
The first of Alexander’s Persian Satraps was Mazeus. Mazeus was the former governor
of Babylon and a member of the Persian aristocracy. While Darius was in flight, Mazeus
surrendered Babylon to Alexander in late 331BC.115 Ernst Badian states, “Mazeus is a living
symbol of Alexander’s policies in transition.”116 Badian strengthens the argument by further
speculating that “Babylon was not really friendly to Persian rule, for the Persians had destroyed
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the temple of Bel and failed to respect local religion as Cyrus had done in his day.”117 The
importance of Mazeus to Alexander is his connection with the Persian aristocracy. Although the
Babylonians may have been less than happy with the Persian power structure as Badian
surmises, they accepted it. Alexander in a brilliant move to surmount any tensions between his
appointed official and the populace “met the Chaldeans [the administrators of the religious rites],
and carried out all their recommendations on the Babylonian temples, and… sacrificed to
Baal.”118 In Babylon he was able to secure the loyalty of the influential religious leaders as well
as the Persian aristocracy.
Over the land of Susiana, which had surrendered its city, Susa, he left the former satrap
Abulites in control in late 331.119 Again Alexander chose to grant some level of clemency
toward any who freely surrendered, and showed that he understood that a large urban area would
be led most easily by its former administrator. Susa was spared any military action and its
treasury was taken to assist in financing the campaign. These actions in Susa, like those in
Babylon, serve as precursors to Alexander’s assimilation of the title, King of Persia.
After the loss of Babylon and Susa, Darius was in full flight. The sources agree that
Alexander next appointed as satrap Oxydates120 who was given the land of Media.
Oxdates was a former prisoner of Darius121 and was allowed to join the forces of Alexander
when they freed him in Susa. Therefore it is safe to assume that Alexander trusted his newly
appointed satrap, for he left him to his own devices and continued to pursue Darius until learning
of his death. The sources disagree whether Alexander’s appointment occurred prior to or
following the death of Darius, but the time between the appointment and the death is negligible.
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Darius died a victim of betrayal at the direction of one of his own satraps, Bessus. The
death of Darius must have been somewhat disappointing for Alexander, but any disappointment
was short-lived. Now Alexander was faced with consolidating the wildest reaches of the Persian
Empire. He was in Bactria at the time and had to quickly cow any resistance to his ascension to
the kingship. Alexander embarked on a new phase of his campaign where he would assume the
title and the adapted appearance of the old Achaemenid kings.122
The Persian Realm after Darius
Alexander’s pragmatic reasoning behind appointing Persian satraps in the Persian
heartland is readily apparent. Alexander and his forces were deep inside foreign territory and
needed to maintain security in the western Persian realm. To assist in this Susa and Babylon
were now fixed with indebted satraps, owing allegiance for their positions to Alexander, and
strong Macedonian led garrisons. In these cities, the garrisons were fortified to withstand any
popular uprising if they should occur. In the wild lands of Media an ally was needed to keep the
native populations under control.
The inclusion of the garrison is a significant fact often ignored by scholars. It is clear that
while Alexander seemed hopeful that newly reappointed Persian governors would remain loyal,
he positioned a garrison of trustworthy Macedonians in close proximity. He would not rely on
trust and oaths alone to secure his territory. This is not necessarily a sign of doubt but rather a
prudent appointment of security forces for the cities. The sources generally provide names of
garrison commanders in conjunction with any urban satrapal appointment.
Initially the consolidation sorties were simply an attempt to locate and subdue the
remainder of Darius’ mercenary force and any remaining Persian units. Pursuit led to encounters
with several nomadic eastern peoples and the eventual capture and claim of control over the
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entire existing Persian Empire. From the time of Darius’ death Alexander followed a logical
strategic track to replace or extract oaths of loyalty from the remaining Persian satraps.
In the ensuing years following the death of Darius Alexander allowed a number of former
satraps to remain in their previous stations. Alexander made these appointments as he secured
the remaining geographical limits of the empire. Each of his new satraps served to maintain
security in the newly acquired provinces. It is evident that he only chose to allow leadership
roles to those who freely acquiesced and offered no resistance.
The sources indicate only one instance of open rebellion by an appointee. Satibarzanes,
newly reappointed satrap of Aria (modern northern Iran), slaughtered the Macedonian garrison
and openly led a rebellion against Alexander’s rule. The rebellion was quickly crushed by a
contingent sent from Alexander’s main force.123 Arsaces, a Persian, was placed in the satrapy
after this.124 Arsaces’ appointment as replacement for Satibarzanes is significant. It illustrates
the apparent faith Alexander had in a Persian’s ability to manage other Persians.
Ironically, Alexander’s faith was abused, for Arsaces was removed during the next year,
329, and replaced with a Cypriot Greek, Stasanor.125 Alexander’s patience was finite and this
placement of a Greek in the satrapy appears to highlight an implicit trust that one of his own
commanders would not be so unreliable. Badian presents the idea that Alexander probably held
more faith in his own men by outlining the makeup of the later empire after Alexander embarked
into India. He states, “Bactria-Sogdiana, Aria, and Arachosia – formed a solid layer of provinces
strongly held by Greeks or Macedonians, watching over western Iran (in Oriental hands) and
guarding Alexander’s rear for the Indian campaign.”126
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The number of Persian satrapal appointments during the eastern phase of the campaign is
significant. Persians were almost exclusively appointed satrap in this phase of consolidation.
Even though the sources mention the various individuals,127 those who were allowed to either
retain a former position as satrap or who won the title through Alexander’s favor, they do little to
explain their significance. It is not necessary to mention them in turn, for only brief
introductions of the new satraps are provided and all served to fortify Alexander’s position in the
east. However brief, the mention leads one to assume that Alexander deemed the Persians would
have less difficulty with the native populace.
This explanation for the satrapal appointments, the strengthening, protecting and
consolidation of the empire in the late campaign, still engenders debate among scholars. A.B.
Bosworth viewed these appointments as “determined by relatively short-term considerations.”128
Bosworth continues to promote his idea that Alexander had no intention to create a unified
realm. N.G.L. Hammond counters this claim by citing the many cities that Alexander created
and settled with Macedonians, Greeks and native peoples. Hammond credits his assertion to the
“ancient evidence that Alexander aimed at coexistence and partnership between Europeans and
Asians, which would inevitably result in an interaction between the two civilizations.”129
The large number of Europeans (Macedonians and Greek mercenaries)130 in the eastern
regions is a direct result of a policy of newly-constructed cities. Bosworth remains too
pessimistic in this case and fails to admit that city building or colonization has an implicit
connotation of longevity or permanence.131 Hammond is surely correct in his analysis but does
not go far enough to explain the significance of the interaction, whether positive or negative.
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One can accept Bosworth’s view of “short-term considerations” but it may be useful to say that
the “short-term” equates to the immediate security concerns of Alexander. Once these concerns
were met the policies could then be enacted without fear of attack or uprising.
Donald Engels, studying the logistics of the Macedonian army, may have found the most
significant reason behind the construction of colonies. Colonies were to serve first as bases of
operations because, “Alexander would never commit his entire army for a campaign into a
region that had not surrendered to him in advance. [For] the main army remained behind at a
base well supplied with provisions.”132 Such strategic camps were the origins of the eastern
colonies. These bases also served as defensive positions against the nomadic tribes that
inhabited the eastern reaches of the Persian Empire. Alexander, “tried to defend the Iranian
territories, developing agriculture, sedentary culture, and later Greek urbanization partly by
military blows, partly by the foundation of Alexandreia Eschate [to ward against] the predatory
invasions of the nomads.”133 Alexander’s actions seem well placed for a long-term occupation
of territory. The land was neither plundered nor razed, it was settled, evidence enough to counter
assertions that he did not have such plans.
Alexander consolidated his eastern empire and even attempted to extend its limits into
western India. The lands taken within India were acquisitions of opportunity. Before the
Macedonians entered India, many rumors circulated among them concerning the savagery and
military might of the inhabitants of that strange land. There was reluctance at first to cross into
India as a result of these stories but this reluctance was eliminated shortly after entering India.
The earliest forays into India and the subsequent battles with native princes proved to be
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relatively one-sided and beneficial for Alexander. Within the interior Alexander appointed, in
essence, satraps to govern over large tracts of land. This seems to be an extension of the Persian
system that Alexander had adopted and may indicate his acceptance of this as a superior
governing structure. King Porus, having won Alexander’s admiration for his daring in battle,
became the first client king of Alexander. Porus134 was allowed to maintain his holdings and
rule his realm as he saw fit with a modicum of tribute or tax to be collected and sent to
Alexander. The Macedonians saw the benefit to leaving the popular Porus in power as a means
to maintain the friendship and control of the native population. This arrangement would be
maintained as long as he remained an ally to the Macedonians. The status of client king for
Porus basically mirrored the powers imbued to the satraps appointed by Alexander.
The evidence indicates that Alexander did indeed desire a large consolidated realm. His
actions after the death of Darius follow a logical track of land acquisition followed by city
building which resulted in the successful conquest of the entire Persian land empire. Alexander
surely acted on opportunities as they occurred, as Bosworth would agree. However, it is
apparent that he was desirous of more, for it was not necessary for him to take up the raiment of
Persian kings or adopt components of their court policies to conquer land. This equipage was
more for the Persian populaces benefit then his and will be shown below. Alexander viewed the
appointing of satraps as necessary to maintain long-term stability in his realm. The Macedonians
could hold the conquered peoples at bay, but chose not to simply subjugate them. Satraps served
to ease the cultures into a state of shared community and are indicators of Alexander’s overall
strategy for a stable empire.
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Chapter 5
Manipulating Perception

In the land of Hyrcania, after Darius’ death, Alexander began to present himself in the
accoutrements of the Persian aristocracy. The costume was not entirely Persian but very
significant because it challenged the Macedonians’ image of king and commander. There was
loud opposition to this image that he was creating. Even more significant is Alexander’s
unwavering confidence in the Persian form of dress in the midst of dissent concerning this new
policy. Alexander’s adoption of foreign dress during his eastern campaign presents the most
benign of his new policies toward the conquered. This appears to be an effort to make him more
palatable and easily recognizable as ruler over the subjugated. Alexander used many forms of
propaganda in conjunction with the attire of Persian kings. One could surmise that Alexander
must have felt extremely confident that it was more important to consolidate his realm than to
cater to the sensibilities of his troops.
It may have been enough for Alexander to simply bear a remote resemblance to the
former kings of Persia to accomplish his aims; but he did not stop with simple dress changes.
Persian court practices became employed in the later campaign to complement the image of
Great King. Each seems to have been structured for a specific audience. The choice of garments
was mainly for the commoners who may have never caught a glimpse of royalty before, but
would surely recognize the opulent dress. Then the functional employment of court custom was
meant for the Persian aristocracy who were essential to maintain the security of the kingdom.
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Arrian saw this public persona as a very deliberate attempt to win over support from the
Asian populace. Despite the fact that Arrian pays scant attention to Alexander’s well-crafted
image campaign, his assessment seems to be less hostile than that seen in the other sources, i.e.
Diodorus, Justin, and Quintus Curtius. He suggests Alexander’s “adoption of Persian equipage
was a device… towards the Persians, so that their King might not appear wholly removed [alien]
from them.”135
Another story from Arrian indicates that taking up the Persian mantle may have not been
wholly Alexander’s idea. It may have been a reaction. After the death of Darius, his killer
Bessus “was wearing his cap upright, dressing in Persian royal garb, calling himself Artaxerxes
instead of Bessus, and giving out that he was King of Asia.”136 Arrian goes on to explain that
once Bessus assumed the persona of “King of Asia”, he (Bessus) anticipated an influx of support
from various groups allied under the rule of Darius.137 Though sources do not confirm this,
Alexander may have felt the need to take up the Persian image in order to counter Bessus’ claim
to the throne.
Alexander’s entire eastern campaign following the death of Darius was one of
consolidation, and Bessus posed a serious threat to this aim. Bessus had an ethnic legitimacy
that Alexander did not possess. Even though Alexander took up the mantle of the Persian King
he did not change his own name. Bessus surely possessed a natural command of the language
and customs and was using the familiar dynastic title Artaxerxes. He would have to be dealt
with quickly before too many Persian subjects saw and identified with Bessus as the new High
King.
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Plutarch provides perhaps the most detailed description of Alexander’s new dress. In late
330 BC Alexander, “first put on the barbaric dress … from a desire to adapt himself to the native
customs, believing that community of race and custom goes far towards softening the hearts of
men.”138
Plutarch is hypothesizing a methodical political strategy in this instance. Through his narrative
he presents the start of a grand strategy by Alexander. Plutarch goes further with a description of
a synthesized version of dress used by Alexander:
He did not adopt the famous Median fashion of dress, which was altogether barbaric and
strange, nor did he assume trousers, or sleeved vest, or tiara, but carefully devised a
fashion which was midway between the Persian and the Median, more modest than the
one and more stately than the other.139
In other writings Plutarch and the remaining sources speak of this tactic in a much more
romantic, and in the case of the vulgate sources, a negative, fashion. The first instance of this by
Plutarch shows:
as sovereign of both nations and benevolent king he strove to acquire the good will of the
conquered by showing respect for their apparel, so that they might continue constant in
loving the Macedonians as rulers, and might not feel hate toward them as enemies.140
Again this statement, although dripping with Plutarch’s romanticism, indicates what would seem
to be his sense that the wearing of the Persian garments by Alexander was practical. Plutarch
rationalized this action further by questioning the manner in which Alexander’s Persian subjects
considered this change in dress: “Must they not rather wonder at his wisdom, since by but a
slight alteration of his apparel he made himself the popular leader of all Asia, conquering their
bodies by his arms, but winning over their souls by his apparel?”141 This is surely too stark a
representation of the Persian reaction to Alexander’s new appearance. The fact that there was no
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major uprising may be an indication of Persian acquiescence to the imagery promoted by
Alexander. However imagery alone almost certainly was not the sole factor. Under the
dominion of Alexander life for most of the Persian citizenry remained unchanged. The Persians
were also aware of the Macedonian’s military might and speed with which they were able to
crush any resistance. Plutarch’s recounting is useful because it seems to provide a general sense
that the policy was successful while Alexander lived.
The remaining sources tend to borrow from one another and maintain a fairly negative
tone throughout their interpretations of Alexander’s measures. However negative, significant
information can be gleaned from these sources; but each must be viewed cautiously. Quintus
Curtius Rufus begins with a fairly benevolent description of Alexander’s means of dress. He
details this dress stating, “he wore on his head a purple head-band interwoven with white, like
the one Darius had once had…”142 This unambiguous detail belies the inherent prejudice found
in Curtius’ writing against Alexander.
Curtius marks the implementation of the Persian headdress and cloak as the turning point
in Alexander’s Asian campaign. He ceases being a “cultured” Greek and slips into the role of
foreign despot all too easily, in the eyes of Curtius. Curtius’ interpretation appears to be overly
critical toward any such policy that Alexander may have been attempting. Curtius conjectures,
“His [Alexander’s] claim was that he was wearing Persian spoils, but the fact was that with the
clothing he had also adopted Persian habits, and a contemptuous demeanor accompanied the
ostentatious dress.”143 Alexander would then order his most loyal and elite troops to take up the
Persian dress.144
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It is true that Alexander did institute some of the Persian court gestures and procedures
once this new mantle was taken up. Curtius suggests an Alexander overcome with hubris and
barbarous ideas. An underlying tone of prejudice is detectable in Curtius. He was clearly
writing in a manner suggesting a lack of regard for anything associated with the Persians and
their kings. A negative tone does not invalidate Curtius as a source, but it leads one to take a
much more cautious approach to accepting his conclusions.
Justin’s recounting of Alexander’s adoption of Persian attire lies in the same vein as
Curtius. Although Justin is writing an epitome of the history of Pompeius Trogus, his prejudice
colors the epitome with his own ideas of proper decorum. The evidence that Justin presents
serves to enrich the other sources. However, he adds what would seem to be his afterthoughts
about the motive through which Alexander enacted such changes.
An example of this is can be seen when, “Alexander assumed the dress of the kings of
Persia and a diadem [a white cloth headband tied behind the head] something former
Macedonian kings had never worn – submitting as it were to the rules of those whom he had
defeated.”145 It is true that early Macedonian kings are not recorded as ever wearing the diadem;
nevertheless, Justin sets a negative tone in this instance. The end of the above statement is an
admonishment against Alexander and only conjecture on Justin’s part. Justin fails to provide the
necessary historical corroboration to validate his overly negative position.
Similarly to Curtius, Justin briefly mentions Alexander’s imposition of the Persian cloak
on his Companions. Unlike Curtius however, Justin attempts to provide a reason for this action:
“In order to avoid excessive animosity, if he were seen to be alone in adopting such garb, he also
instructed his friends [the Companion cavalry and commanding officers] to wear long gold and
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purple robes.”146 Alexander’s purpose begs justification here. Justin neglects to provide a clear
explanation of who would hold animosity against Alexander, the Persians or his own troops.
One could surmise that Alexander may have had more difficulty with some of his more
traditional-minded Macedonian compatriots rather than any Persian subject concerning this garb.
The uprising at Opis in 324 is evidence of the tension between the king and the Macedonians
showing clearly the troop’s objection to Alexander’s deference to the Persians. Thus the
conclusion that the Macedonians would object strenuously to the change in attire seems
probable. The question remains: what was the purpose of this edict?
A particular line of reasoning can be proposed. Alexander wanted to create the
appearance of a familiar leader rather than a foreign conqueror. At this time Alexander had
taken control over the dynastic and satrapal holdings of Darius and would need a means of
endearing himself and his Companions to his new subjects. Wearing the guise of the Persian
king was a simple task. This use of Persian material culture can be seen as an attempt to make
the new king more palatable to his new subjects.
Wishing to ingratiate himself with the Persian citizenry further he honored the memory of
the Persian ruler Cyrus the Great in 324 by having his tomb and body restored to a place of
dignity. This act is intriguing in its complexity. Some of the Persian populace had viewed
Darius as a pretender king of questionable blood. Alexander called upon the most basic level of
the Persian’s historical identity by honoring Cyrus. He appeared to be claiming a filial bond
with a revered Persian figure. One could guess that the act was indicative of what a true
successor would deem as necessary. Being the true King of the Persians, Alexander was
required to honor his predecessors as Darius had never done.
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Adopting previous Achaemenid attire served as the least obtrusive means to gain public
acceptance. According to Justin he wore the diadem as well as the royal purple, marking him as
the effective King of Asia. His Companions, now similarly clad, were to resemble the freshly
supplanted Persian aristocracy. This seems to be a logical explanation.
Diodorus Siculus provides a fairly detailed description of Alexander and the wearing of
Persian dress. Alexander, “put on the Persian diadem and dressed himself in the white robe and
the Persian sash and everything else except the trousers and the long sleeved upper garment.”147
The similarity with the details provided by Plutarch concerning the omission of trousers is
unique among the ancient sources and could indicate a common source148 shared by these two.
The simple manner of dressing the part of Persian king was one component of the
complex system that Alexander would employ to endear himself to the Persian citizenry.
Although diverging at points, sources agree on the creation of the policy and the general image it
created.
Stewart postulates that Alexander did not wear the entire Persian costume because he
“never really aspired merely to be Great King”.149 He alludes to a desire by Alexander to
conquer much more than simply the former Persian Empire. At this time Alexander was still
consolidating the power base of the old empire. The evidence does not support this statement
fully nor is it wise to project future actions on the act of not wearing pieces of the royal
garments. Reasons for Alexander’s decision are not discussed definitively in the sources and
therefore should be promulgated with extreme caution. Alexander would have been cognizant
of the impact such a transformation of image may have had on his own troops, so he
incorporated Persian regalia into the dress of his own companions. Although he may have felt
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totally secure in his relationship with the Macedonians he felt compelled to include them, thus
silencing their objections to the changes. Consequently, a standardized and uniform officer
corps would assist in his objective to become more identifiable by the Persian populace and
aristocracy.
Proskynesis and the Coming of the Epigonoi
Even as Alexander changed his image and imposed on his troops components of Persian
costume he still found it necessary to further strengthen his bond with the Persian nobles.
Persians had a very different relationship with their kings compared to that of the Macedonians.
The kings of Macedon had always maintained power through a bond of camaraderie with their
troop commanders. The companions were trusted friends and advisors not used to formality and
pomp. The notion of Persian kingship was very different to the Greeks, consisting of an absolute
monarchy with power to rule derived from the gods.150 Alexander must have been aware of this
distinction and went about changing court proceedings to reflect a pageantry or ceremony that
was more recognizable by the Persians. He had previously changed his royal accoutrements in
order to make himself more recognizable to his new Persian subjects. Why would Alexander be
compelled to enact this change? It would seem that Alexander sought now to be functionally the
king of Persia through ceremony in conjunction with iconography already being used.
At this stage of the campaign after capturing the Persian pretender Bessus in 329,151
Alexander effectively ended all other claims to the vacant Achaemenid throne. By 328 B.C. the
majority of the eastern frontier of the Persian Empire had been brought under control. Alexander
in an attempt to further ingratiate the Persians to himself enacted a controversial requirement of
proskynesis, or prostration, within the king’s presence by all under his command.
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This was a wholly Persian ceremonial device and was met with much dismay by the
Macedonians. This was seen as a breach in the bonds of brotherhood shared between the king
and his companions. They had never before been required to pay homage to their general and
were taken back by what seemed to be an act of hubris. Hubris was viewed by the GrecoMacedonian world as the ultimate sin, a total disregard for the mores of the time for one’s own
desires.
The Macedonian troops in 324 looked with skepticism on the arrival of a Macedonian
styled military unit consisting totally of Persian youths.152 This was a cause for alarm from
many of the general troops as they continued to see Alexander’s image change. They may have
been concerned that their king was becoming too like the Persian monarchs in thought as well as
deed. What they failed to realize was that this was indicative of yet another attempt at
engendering confidence and loyalty among his Persian subjects, not a departure from his reliance
on them. Often overlooked by scholars is the fact that the Epigonoi were commissioned for
training in 330 or 329; this occurred either before or shortly after Alexander assumed Persian
accoutrements and definitely before he enacted any Persian political ritual. The Macedonians
failed to understand that this unit was a product of foresight by Alexander, not of hubris.
If they had been afraid that their king and his followers were looking “too Persian,” then
the arrival of 30,000 noble Persian youths equipped with the full array of Macedonian armor and
weaponry, marching in an orderly phalanx formation may have done something to alleviate that
fear. For the Persians, too, the Macedonian phalanx may have now become a source of pride,
rather than of fear. Unfortunately, the traditionally xenophobic Macedonians did not understand
the purpose behind this and complained vigorously. The troops felt “as if Alexander was
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actually contriving every means of reducing his dependence on Macedonians in [the]
future…”153
If Mazeus, satrap of Babylon, was symbolic of transition154 then the Epigonoi were
symbols of Alexander’s policies achieving fruition. They embodied what Alexander sought to
achieve with his propaganda campaign. The Epigonoi personified a crossing of cultures. Shortly
before the arrival of the Epigonoi in Susa, Alexander enacted his most personal policy: a
political marriage alliance between men at all levels of his most trusted Companions and the
Persian aristocracy.
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Chapter 6
Marriage Alliance Expanded

Alexander surely inherited some of the political ideas of his father, and Philip II was a
firm believer in the usefulness of political marriage. Clearly his motives for such political unions
were to quell tensions between the peoples on the fringes of Macedonian territory and Macedon.
The case of his marriage to an Illyrian princess serves as a clear indicator. Alexander took this
basic concept and shaped one of the most significant policies of his later campaign. Not only did
Alexander follow the policy previously employed by his father, he amplified it to include one
hundred of his most trusted Companions.
Several hypotheses can be formulated concerning this act. The first sees it simply as a
continuation of Philip’s matrimonial diplomacy. Alexander expands this not only through other
cultures but through his own troops as well. Another viewpoint, probably the most significant,
stems from the fusion theory argued by Tarn. It holds that Alexander was attempting to create a
common race and culture. Each will be discussed in turn.
The sources are scant with reference to the political machinations of Alexander toward
the marriage contract. In some instances it was believed that Alexander arranged the marriage at
Susa in 324 BC to cement the bond between himself and his Macedonians. Justin records that
Alexander, “presented to the Macedonian noblemen unmarried girls selected from the best
families amongst all the conquered peoples, so that any recrimination against the king might be
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lessened through their complicity in his action.”155 Justin appears to oversimplify here. While it
seems clear that Alexander’s intent was indeed to strengthen the bond with his troops in this
way, Justin’s use of the word “complicity” makes it appear criminal, and is a function of his own
prejudice.
The care Alexander showed in selecting brides for his closest friends is evident in
Arrian’s account where:
To Hephaestion, he [Alexander] gave Drypetis, another daughter of Darius, sister to his
own wife[Barsine](for he desired Hephaestion’s children to be cousins to his own); to
Craterus, Amastrine daughter of Oxyartes, Darius’ brother; to Perdiccas, a daughter of
Atropates, satrap of Media; to Ptolemy the bodyguard and Eumenes the royal secretary,
the daughters of Artabazus[the newly appointed satrap of Bactria], Artacama and Artonis
respectively; to Nearchus, the daughter of Barsine and Mentor; to Seleucus the daughter
of Spitamenes the Bactrian, and similarly to the other Companions.156
Arrian’s benefit is without question here, for no other source provides such a detailed register of
the pairings. One clearly sees that for Alexander’s officers each bride comes from the house of
prominent Persian figures. The pairings are indicative of the broad plans Alexander projected
for the empire.
In “Alexander and the Persian Women” Elizabeth Carney mistakenly sees this mass
marriage as occurring “only when he had truly changed the base of his power…”157 She
continues: “his marriage to Stateira being part of his rejection of Macedonia and one of the many
signs that he had become an Asian ruler.”158 Although the significance of marrying Stateira, the
daughter of Darius, is unquestionable, the inclusion of his troops and commanders should be
testament enough that Alexander had not rejected Macedon. Another equally critical view of
Alexander’s marriage policies is put forth by Shahbazi. Shahbazi in an attempt to view these
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arrangements from a Persian perspective proposes, “It is often forgotten that while he and his
Macedonian officers could take Persian ladies of highest rank in marriage, not a single Persian
prince was allowed to marry a Macedonian lady, surely a sign that “sharing” was not sincere at
all.”159 While Shahbazi is correct regarding Persian male-Macedonian female marriage he fails
to take into account the make-up of the Macedonian army. By the time Alexander sought to
make alliances with Persian nobility through marriage contracts, his troops had already taken
captive, foreign (Persian and other) women as brides. The sources give no indication that it was
common practice for the Macedonians to allow any notable women on campaign.
The mass marriage at Susa was not however, the first political union forged by
Alexander. In 327 BC he “had already taken to wife Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes the
Bactrian.”160 Plutarch ruminates, “His marriage to Roxana[e]… was a love affair, and yet it was
thought to harmonize well with the matters he had in hand. For the Barbarians were encouraged
by the partnership into which the marriage brought them…”161 The key distinction is that the
marriage with Roxane was in the Macedonian style and the later mass marriage at Susa was
“solemnized in the Persian style.”162 The formalization of the wedding in the Macedonian style
seems to indicate something more than a simple political union between Alexander and Roxane.
There could have been some truth to the sources’ claims that Alexander felt love at first sight:
but whether or not he loved Roxane is irrelevant. More important is the occasion wherein this
ceremony took place. Unlike the ceremony later held at Susa, where Alexander had the upper
echelon of Persian society as witnesses and participants, the marriage with Roxane had few
Persian witnesses. This union did not have far-reaching goals in mind when it was made. This
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practical union, whether for love or not, created a strong tie with the father of Roxane, Oxyartes,
a powerful leader in the wild countryside.
Sources indicate Alexander’s willingness, or rather his express desire, to pursue more
Persian-like rituals and rites at Susa. In what must have assuredly been a grand ceremony not
held in secret, Alexander had the perfect venue for showing the populace that he was not a
terrifying outsider but one who shared and appreciated their own traditions.
The ceremony at Susa was not the first instance of Alexander allowing troops to wed
Persian and oriental wives. Shortly after taking up the diadem in 330, in an attempt to quash the
desires of his general troops to return homeward he “allowed his soldiers to marry any of the
captive women with whom they were cohabitating, for he thought they would be less eager to
return home if they had in camp some semblance of a home and domestic setting.”163 Thus,
Justin characterizes Alexander’s reason for allowing such a union between conquerors and
conquered as pragmatic. The “veterans could be replaced by their sons [from the union with
foreign wives], who as young recruits would serve on the ramparts on which they had been
born.”164 The progeny of these unions would inherit the colonies and cities formed in the
campaign. They would be of both lineages: Greco-Macedonian and Persian. These new citizens
may be indicative of Alexander’s overall attempt to create stronger links between the
Macedonians and Persians.
Following this edict granting marriage to foreign, captive wives, Justin indicates that
Alexander founded a city called “Alexandria [whose location was on] the river Tanais.”165 He
further shows, “[Alexander] also founded twelve cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, dispersing
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amongst them those members of his army whom he regarded as malcontents.”166 Alexander
allowed troops to settle in the new cities and although the sources do not mention fully his intent
it is more than likely that these troops functioned as garrisons. It is also unknown to what extent
that the new colonists were married to foreign wives. Colonization during the Persian campaign
could indeed be interpreted as a pragmatic policy to strengthen the claim to the eastern provinces
but the sources provide little information.
Political marriages during the late Persian campaign have been interpreted in ways that
seem to range from the almost biological in nature to the purely philosophical.

Tarn’s concept,

fusion, is directly connected to biology and indicates a desire by Alexander to construct a new
mixed race. The brotherhood of man is another concept which suggests that Alexander sought a
position as benevolent king or patriarch over the subjects within his realm.
Universalism, Fusion, and the Brotherhood of Man
Modern scholastic traditions concerning Alexander remain entrenched in their
persistence to promote aspects of his character or actions. One such emphasis explores events
late in the campaign when Alexander further placed upon the Persian aristocracy, i.e. the Persian
princesses167 and the Epigonoi, a requirement to learn Greek. It should be noted that the
Epigonoi were not exclusively of the aristocratic class but exhibited physical qualities that
distinguished them from common Persian citizens. In the discussion of this edict along with the
general intermingling through marriage of both troops and Companions to foreign wives,
Alexander’s intention has been widely debated. Did Alexander attempt to create one race as
asserted by Tarn? Or did he simply wish there to be easier communication between the
newlyweds? Did Alexander desire to extend his realm to all known areas of the world? Was he
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the benevolent patriarch over mankind some propose? The questions have been addressed time
and time again but continue to stir debate. The debate is linked to the historians choice of a
preferred source. By differing on which sources are more accurate or reliable, scholars continue
to disagree.
W.W. Tarn, following Plutarch closely, argues that Alexander’s intent must have been an
attempt to fuse together Greeks and barbarians and eventually create a common culture. Tarn’s
interpretation of Alexander’s intent seems to be too heavily derived from Plutarch’s Moralia.
This work by Plutarch was much more ideologically charged than the narrative Life of
Alexander, and consequently this must be viewed with much caution. It differs dramatically
from a historical narrative, and is really a form of social commentary.
The brotherhood of man is a philosophical construct based on Plutarch. This
misunderstanding is furthered by Tarn’s misuse of Isocrates’ homonoia as an indicator for
Alexander’s future policies, should not be heavily relied on for it is not supported by the sources.
The term homonoia was employed by Isocrates much earlier and functions in a much more
narrow sense than Plutarch’s or Tarn’s use. Tarn’s hypothesized fusion policy falls short,
because he relied more on philosophical analysis rather than source evidence. Language learning
or the imposition of language upon a people is not a satisfactory argument for “fusion.” One
should consider, of course, that the Persian Empire was Hellenized as a result of Alexander’s
policies. In this sense a form of fusion occurred – but it came as a result of cultural processes,
not from a definite policy as Tarn seems to propose.
Alexander’s imposition of marriage between his Companions and the Persian aristocracy
is indicative of a pragmatic plan of rule. The sources never indicate that Alexander imposed
Greek on either the outlying Satraps or native populations. The lands of the eastern empire and
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India were allowed to be ethnically the same as before. There were some instances of
colonization within these lands, but those cities were bastions for diverse populations -- not
limited to Greek custom or language; and the sources do not indicate that Greek was levied on
the non-Greeks. If Greek would have been imposed upon the whole of the realm then the fusion
argument might have more plausibility. But in fact there was a definite influence on the native
peoples living in proximity with the new inhabitants.
Political marriage is not sufficient evidence of a desire for a “brotherhood of man.” This
is Plutarch’s construction. The marriage arrangements that were made only appear to serve
political purposes. There appears to be only one exception to this, with regard to Alexander’s
desire to be connected to his most trusted Companion Hephaestion through a union with the
daughters of Darius.168 Plutarch’s romanticism with regards to the marriage at Susa was
accepted and promoted too intensely by Tarn.
Alexander’s actions after the death of Darius show that his ultimate concern was the
secure administration of a large realm. Tarn’s conclusions were not altogether incorrect, for the
sources do seem to indicate that Alexander was in the process of establishing a “fused” realm -but not in the sense of one race under Alexander. From this it must be agreed that Tarn’s
“fusion” was too reliant on the social commentary of Plutarch and Tarn’s seeming desire to
construct a benevolent Alexander figure.
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Conclusion

Alexander the Great subjugated the Persian Empire and large portions of western India in
only eleven years. Scholars have speculated on aspects of Alexander’s campaign, some
attributing his success to tyche or fortune, others to Alexander’s debt to his father, Philip II of
Macedon, and still others assert that Alexander held a philosophical belief that he was duty
bound to save the barbarians from themselves. He was not at every point of his journey
infallible. Alexander the Great committed atrocities, he enslaved large groups of his enemies
and he may have been responsible for the deaths of many of his own troops. However, these
events are just sidelights to what would become his greatest accomplishment, the consolidation
and administration of the largest empire that had yet been seen. The major argument throughout
this study shows that after 330 BC, with the fall of the last of the Achaemenids, Alexander
focused on acculturation and absorption of the Persian Empire; he was not (as scholars have
argued) a servant of tyche or devoid of thought concerning a large, sustained empire.
It is quite clear that Alexander diverged from the common Greco-Macedonian tradition of
prejudice and xenophobia. His actions and their consequences remain a testament to his
foresight and flexibility. The sources document loud opposition to Alexander’s innovative
policies, illustrating the concerns felt by his compatriots. Alexander heard consternation and
asked for his troops’ trust in those matters.

Some modern scholars have argued that Alexander

could not abandon these provocative policies because he was consumed with self interest. It
seems that their conclusions are based upon a comparison with the former kings of Macedon.
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Because Alexander did not follow a traditional Greco-Macedonian style of rule it is thought that
he must have been unjustified in his actions. That Alexander was different from his predecessors
is undeniable; but this does not in itself mean that he was abandoning his heritage. Although he
would not be bound too tightly by the traditions of his fathers before him, Alexander throughout
the entire campaign strove to maintain strong ties with his companions.
Alexander used three key component policies to form the conquered territory into what
he thought would be the most secure realm. He appointed Persian satraps to administer Persian
populations. He cemented his bond with the most influential Persians and the lowliest peasants
with imagery they could recognize. Finally he had his most important Companions married to
the daughters of noteworthy Persian aristocrats. The sources agree on the substance of each of
these decisions, if not on the motivation for them.
W.W. Tarn laid the foundation for nearly all acceptable modern scholarship of
Alexander. The image of Alexander that Tarn created is one of benevolence, clearly drawn too
heavily from Plutarch’s Moralia. Plutarch’s work is more a function of Plutarch’s own
philosophical thinking about Alexander rather than an image based on careful use of source
evidence. Tarn was not altogether incorrect in his findings, but his tendency to magnify the
positive attributes of Alexander is unbalanced and in need of scrutiny.
The work of A.B. Bosworth is more inclined to focus on the military aspects of the
campaign of Alexander. Bosworth promotes the image of Alexander the conqueror and autocrat,
a not wholly incorrect interpretation. Bosworth focuses on the military elements of the campaign
and he chooses to rely on the vulgate tradition’s projection of the sentiment of the troops, and its
emphasis on aversion to or rebellion against Alexander’s actions, to construct his image of the
Macedonian king. Highlighting this is Bosworth’s assertion that Alexander’s adoption of
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Persian dress was a result of the absence of Parmenio.169 For Bosworth Parmenio represented
the old regime of Philip II: a regime from which Alexander had strayed too far. He portrayed
Parmenio as a foil to Alexander who acted to maintain the traditional Macedonian identity.
Reliance on that sort of argumentation seems to weaken Bosworth’s claims. By sympathizing
with Parmenio, Bosworth creates a somewhat negative image of Alexander, blaming him for not
acting in the way of previous Macedonian kings. Parmenio becomes a sympathetic character
who is used too often to show how off-track Alexander had wandered.
By maintaining that Alexander was not acting as a Macedonian should, Bosworth
maintains a close parallel with the vulgate sources, and his focus is such that he seems inclined
willingly to ignore the problems with the vulgate sources on which he so heavily relies. These
sources, as discussed above, have to be viewed very skeptically.
The source record is at best incomplete, second-hand and prone to a score of problems.
What is clear is that there is no one definite source authority in terms of authenticity. However,
one can conclude that the historian Arrian seems to make the greatest attempt to maintain the
integrity of the information (the works of Ptolemy and Aristobulus) and add little of his own
personal opinions to his writing. Therefore if one had to choose a “more reliable” source it
seems that Arrian is the safest choice.
Alexander the Great, son of Philip II of Macedon, inherited a rich tradition of military
training, planning and governmental administration and utilized it in a manner the world had
never seen, to conquer and hold the largest single land mass in western history. Refusing to be
bound by xenophobic tradition, Alexander ruled with the assistance of foreign nobles serving as
administrators. He took on a more recognizable and palatable appearance for the newly
conquered and then finally acted to unify the top tier of the Persians with his friends and
169
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commanders. His pragmatism and foresight allowed Alexander to accept all of Persia’s
inhabitants as subjects, regardless of ethnicity, and meld them in a way that would ultimately
contribute to a more stable empire. That was the practical genius of Alexander.
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Appendix:
Satrapal Appointments in the Persian Mainland and Sources

Satrap

Date

Source

*Mazeus…………………………………..331..………………………………Arr.III.16.4.
Curt.5.1.44.
*Abulites………………………………….331...………………………..……Arr.III.16.9.
Curt.5.2.17.
*Phrasaortes………………………..…………………………………………..Curt.5.6.11.
*Oxatheres……..…………………...……....330....……………………..….…Arr.III.19.2.
*Oxydates………………………..…………330…………………………..….Arr.III.20.3.
Curt.6.2.11.
*Autophradates…………….…………….…330…..………………………….Arr.III.23.7.
*Satibarzanes……………………………..…330……………………………..Arr.III.25.1.
Curt.6.6.13.
*Amminapes…..………………………...….330..….…………………………Arr.III.22.1.
Curt.6.4.25.
*Arsaces………………………………..…330….….………………………...Arr.III.25.7.
Curt.8.3.17.
*Phrataphernes…………………………..…..330………………………….…Arr.III.28.2.
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Curt.8.3.17.
*Proexes……………………………………329……………………………...Arr.III.28.4.
Clitus…………………………………………………………………………...Curt.8.1.19.
Amyntas………………………………………………………………………..Curt.8.2.14.
*Artabazus…………………………………329..…..…………………………Arr.III.29.1.
Curt.7.5.1.
Stasanor……………………………………329..……………………………..Arr.III.29.5.
Curt.8.3.17.
Menon………………………………………………………………………….Curt.4.8.11.
Stamenes………………………………….328……………………...………..Arr.IV.18.3.
Curt.8.3.17.
*Tyriaspes [Tiridates]………………………327…..…………...…….………Arr.IV.22.5.
Diod.Sic.XVII.81.2.
Nicanor……………………………………326..………………………...……Arr.IV.28.6.
Philip son of Machatas……………………326……………………….……...…Arr.V.8.3.
Curt.10.1.20.
*Porus………………………………………326…..…..……………………….Arr.VI.2.I.
Just.12.8.7.
Diod.Sic.XVII.89.6.
*Oxyartes………………………………...325....……………………………..Arr.VI.15.3.
Peithon……………………………………325…..……………………………Arr.VI.15.4.
Thoas……………………………………...325...……………………………..Arr.VI.27.1.
*Eudaemon………………………..………325..…………………………….Curt.10.1.21.
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Taxiles…………………………………….325…….…………………………Just.13.4.20.
Curt.8.12.14.
Diod.Sic.XVII.86.7.
Peucestas…………………………...……..325.....……………………………Arr.VI.28.3.
Atropates…………………………………..324…………………………….....Arr.VII.4.1.

*Indicates Persian and NonGreco-Macedonian Appointments
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